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VIEWING THE SUPREME COURT'S
EXACTIONS CASES THROUGH THE
PRISM OF ANTI-EVASION
MICHAEL B. KENT, JR.*
This Article considers the U.S. Supreme Court's 2013
decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District, which extended the application of the Court's
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of land use
exactions (known as the Nollan/Dolan test). The majority of
the Court relied heavily on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, explaining that this doctrine formed the basis not
only for the Nollan/Dolan framework but also for the
extension of that framework to Koontz's new factual setting.
Four members of the Court dissented. Although the
dissenting justices seemingly agreed with several of the
majority's propositions, they vigorously opposed the manner
in which the majority applied those propositions.
Although Koontz might be viewed as just another in a long
line of cases that make up the messy jurisprudence of
regulatory takings and unconstitutional conditions, the
primary thesis of this Article is that Koontz in fact provides
a key to unlocking the Court's exactions framework. Relying
on my prior work with Brannon Denning, this Article posits
that both regulatory takings and the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions constitute anti-evasion doctrines
by which the Court seeks to fill enforcement gaps left open by
its prior constitutional decision rules. Inasmuch as land use
exactions lie at the intersection of these two doctrinal areas,
one would expect to find that anti-evasion notions play a
large role in the Court's exactions decisions. And indeed,
both the majority and the dissent in Koontz invoked the anti-
evasion characteristics of the Nollan/Dolan test in support of
their analytical positions in that case.
* Associate Professor, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell
University. Thanks to Brannon Denning, Mark Fenster, David Noll, and Greg
Stein for helpful comments and critiques.
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Viewing Koontz (and its jurisprudential antecedents)
through the prism of anti-evasion helps both to explain the
majority's decision in that case and to bring the differences
between the majority and dissent into sharper focus.
Additionally, the anti-evasion concept suggests some
guidelines for how future exactions issues might be
resolved both at the micro level (dealing with future
decision rules that will have to be developed in light of
Koontz) and at the macro level (addressing larger questions
about the Court's takings jurisprudence and the place of the
exactions cases within it).
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INTRODUCTION
Of the many difficult areas of constitutional law, few have
reputations as infamous as the doctrines of regulatory takings
and unconstitutional conditions. Takings doctrine, for example,
has long been labeled a "muddle"I that is "incomprehensible," 2
"confused,"3  and "famously incoherent." 4 In like manner,
observers have described the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions as a "conundrum," 5 a "minefield,"6 a "quagmire" 7
and a "mess."8 Although scholars have labored to explain both
doctrines, questions persist for which clear answers do not
readily present themselves, resulting in frequent
consternation9 and occasional calls that the doctrines simply be
1. E.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still
a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
2. E.g., Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering
Inherent Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 61 (1996).
3. E.g., D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term
Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due
Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343, 343 (2005).
4. E.g., Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 1, 1 (2003).
5. E.g., Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of
Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 479 (2012).
6. E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
7. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional
Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 951 (2006).
8. E.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional
Conditions, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2014).
9. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001) ('The
persistent challenge . . . has been to articulate some coherent or at least
intelligible principles or tests . . . to support the [unconstitutional conditions]
doctrine."); Blais, supra note 2, at 61 ('Scholars have been trying to make sense of
the Court's [regulatory takings] endeavor for decades, but most concede that they
are unable to do so.").
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jettisoned. 10 Nonetheless, the courts continue to apply the
doctrines,11 and the task remains to explain and evaluate the
principles upon which they rest and the manner in which they
are applied.
This Article contributes to that task by focusing on the
issue where these two doctrines intersect-namely, the
constitutionality of land use exactions. Specifically, I argue
that the Supreme Court's most recent exactions decision,
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,12
provides a key to understanding the Court's exactions cases
and the jurisprudential foundations upon which they rest. In
short, the exactions cases are best understood as anti-evasion
doctrines designed to minimize enforcement gaps left open by
the Court's other takings tests.
A land use exaction generally is defined as "a
governmental requirement that a developer dedicate or reserve
land for public use or improvements, or pay a fee in lieu of
dedication, which is used to purchase land or construct public
improvements."13 Usually, the local government makes these
requirements a condition to obtaining some type of
development approval-for example, a rezoning, the approval
of a subdivision plat, or the issuance of a building permit. 14
Although local governments have long conditioned
development approval on both physical and monetary exactions
that help provide a variety of on-site and off-site
improvements,15 their ability to do so has been constrained
10. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion),
70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594 (1990) (arguing that "the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine should be abandoned"); Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow:
Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 422
(1995) (stating that "the concept of regulatory takings should be abandoned
altogether").
11. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586
(2013) (applying both regulatory takings and unconstitutional conditions
doctrine).
12. Id.
13. Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact
Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 56 (1987).
14. See MICHAEL A. ZISKA ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE
LIABILITY § 18:2, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2015) ("A typical exaction
ordinance requires that developers, as a condition to receiving permit approval,
dedicate land for public purposes, pay a fee to the municipality in lieu of land
dedication, or both.") (emphasis added).
15. See, e.g., EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., 2 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 20:67 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing exactions in context of tree protection
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somewhat by the rules established in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission16 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.17
Rooted in the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, the
Nollan/Dolan standards apply a form of heightened scrutiny to
evaluate whether a challenged exaction constitutes a taking of
private property.18 At the same time, the Court has
characterized Nollan/Dolan as "a special application" of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 19 Thus, the problem of
land use exactions concurrently triggers "two of the most
difficult and intractable problems known to law." 20
In Koontz, the Supreme Court once again waded into these
murky waters, addressing two questions about the applicability
of the Nollan/Dolan test.21 First, the Court considered what
type of government action is necessary to trigger that test.22 In
both Nollan and Dolan, the government had approved a land
use application subject to an exaction-specifically, that the
applicant in each case grant a public easement across its
land.2 3 The question presented in Koontz was whether Nollan/
Dolan was limited to this type of conditional approval or
whether it might also apply to situations where the
government denies an application. A majority of the Court held
that Nollan/Dolan's requirements apply equally irrespective of
whether the government approves a permit subject to a
condition or denies the permit until the applicant accedes to
the condition. 24
Second, the Court addressed the type of exactions that are
subject to Nollan/Dolan's heightened scrutiny. 25 Is the test
limited to the physical exactions at issue in those cases-that
regulations); see also Vicki Been, "Exit" as Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
479-83 (1991) (providing overview of different types of and purposes for
exactions).
16. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
17. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
18. See id. at 386-96 (applying "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality"
standards).
19. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005).
20. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions
Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 85 (2000).
21. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
22. Id. at 2594-98.
23. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 828 (1987).
24. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
25. Id. at 2598-603.
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is, conditions that force a property owner to dedicate some
portion of her land to public use-or does it also apply to
monetary exactions-conditions requiring an owner to pay
money to the government? Over a vigorous dissent, the Koontz
majority rejected the notion that Nollan/Dolan applies only to
physical exactions and explicitly held that monetary exactions
must also satisfy its nexus and proportionality requirements. 26
Not surprisingly, Koontz has received both praise and
censure, and these reactions appear largely to depend on the
particular commenter's view of the appropriate policy balance
between private property rights and governmental regulatory
authority.27 Notwithstanding how one feels about the decision's
policy ramifications, however, it seems clear that the Court's
opinion raises a number of significant doctrinal difficulties.
To the extent that the Nollan/Dolan test is rooted in the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, for example, the Court's
holding that monetary exactions are subject to that test does
not necessarily follow. 28 As Justice Kagan wrote in dissent,
Nollan/Dolan most obviously applies when "the property the
government demands during the permitting process is the kind
it otherwise would have to pay for."29 A requirement that an
owner physically dedicate land to the public fits that
definition; 30 a requirement that the owner pay money to the
26. Id. at 2599.
27. Compare Brian T. Hodges, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District and Its Implications for Takings Law, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y
PRAC. GROUPS, Oct. 2013, at 39, 39 (calling Koontz "one of the most significant
and decisive victories for property owners in decades"), with John D. Echeverria,
Opinion, A Legal Blow to Sustainable Development, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/a-legal-blow-to-sustainable-
development.html [https://perma.cc/3C8T-F5WC] (describing Koontz as
'revolutionary and destructive").
28. See, e.g., Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal Discord:
Analyzing Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1833,
1853 (2010) (acknowledging that limitation of Nollan/Dolan to physical exactions
'might more readily accord with [the] description of [those cases] as flowing from
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions"); Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions After
Lingle: How Basing Nollan and Dolan on the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine Limits Their Scope, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577, 588-601 (2009) (arguing
that unconstitutional conditions doctrine necessarily limits Nollan/Dolan to
physical exactions).
29. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
30. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that permanent physical
occupation of property is taking per se).
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government does not.31 How then can Nollan/Dolan apply to
monetary exactions and still fit within the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions?
A similar problem results from the Court's holding that
Nollan/Dolan does not distinguish between conditions that
accompany regulatory approvals and those that accompany
denials. 32 In the former circumstance-where the government
grants a permit subject to the condition that the applicant turn
something over to the government-it is much easier to see
how the condition might implicate a taking. After all, the
approval affirmatively requires the applicant to transfer to the
government the thing demanded. This link is more attenuated,
however, where the government denies the permit, even if it
indicates a willingness to reverse course should the applicant
make the transfer.33 In this latter scenario, the applicant is
under no obligation to give the government anything and,
accordingly, cannot readily be said to suffer a taking of its
property. 34 And if no property is taken, then the applicant is
not entitled to just compensation, the remedy mandated by the
Takings Clause.35 How then can Nollan/Dolan apply to denials
of land use applications and still fit within the context of the
Court's takings jurisprudence? 36
When confronted with such questions, it often is tempting
to take one or the other of two courses-first, to suggest a
grand theory that attempts to comprehensively explain all of
the nuances and inconsistencies in a particular doctrine or area
of law; or second, to throw up one's hands in frustration and
view any attempt to find consistency as hopeless because it
simply does not exist. It is my aim here to avoid either extreme.
As the opening paragraph of this Article makes clear, both the
31. See Kent, supra note 28, at 1853.
32. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
33. In Nollan itself, the Court assumed that an outright denial of a permit
would not constitute a taking unless doing so would trigger one of the Court's
other takings tests. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36.
34. Indeed, the Koontz majority admitted as much. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at
2597 ("Where the permit is denied and the condition is never imposed, nothing
has been taken.").
35. See id. ("[Tihe Fifth Amendment mandates a particular remedy-just
compensation-only for takings.").
36. At least one scholar has argued that, after Koontz, Nollan and Dolan
should be regarded as substantive due process cases rather than as takings cases.
See Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions,
and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403, 415-17 (2014).
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regulatory takings doctrine and the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions are recondite, at best, and no
attempt to bring absolute clarity to either area is likely to
prove very successful. At the same time, however, both areas
seem to share at least some common principles and
characteristics, suggesting there is perhaps more coherence in
the Court's exactions jurisprudence than some of its critics
have observed.
From a doctrinal standpoint, it appears that a primary
task of both the takings and unconstitutional conditions
doctrines is to prevent the government from elevating form
over substance or doing indirectly what it cannot do directly.
Both doctrines, thus, can be considered what Brannon Denning
and I elsewhere term "anti-evasion doctrines"-that is,
judicially-created decision rules designed to fill doctrinal gaps
by preventing the government from complying with the form of
earlier rules while simultaneously circumventing the
constitutional values those rules were intended to implement.37
We have argued that the Court typically chooses to employ
these anti-evasion doctrines when it perceives there to be a
lack or failure of political safeguards that otherwise might
prevent governmental overreaching.38
Although it does not answer every question raised by
Koontz, this anti-evasion principle helps to explain the
majority's decision in that case and to bring the differences
between the majority and dissent into clearer focus.
Additionally, viewing Koontz through the prism of anti-evasion
suggests some guidelines for how future issues might be
resolved-both at the micro level (dealing with future decision
rules that will have to be developed in light of Koontz) and at
the macro level (addressing larger questions about the Court's
takings jurisprudence and the place of the exactions cases
within it).
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an
overview of the Court's regulatory takings doctrine. Part II
offers a similar synopsis of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Part III sketches Denning's and my theory of anti-
evasion doctrines and situates both takings and
37. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in
Constitutional Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1779.
38. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Anti-Evasion in
Constitutional Law, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 423-24 (2014).
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unconstitutional conditions within that paradigm.
Part IV then turns to Koontz, emphasizing the anti-evasion
themes employed by both the majority and the dissent. Both
sides of the Court agreed that Nollan/Dolan is designed as an
anti-evasion doctrine, and because of this fact, both sides
generally agreed that the applicability of nexus and
proportionality do not depend on whether the government
couches its condition in terms of "approval if' or "denial
unless."39 But the justices parted ways on how far this anti-
evasion principle should extend, 40 and I argue they did so in
part because of different perceptions about the adequacy of
political safeguards to police the boundary between permissible
and impermissible regulatory conduct.
In light of the foregoing, Part V discusses the implications
of Koontz for future litigation. Specifically, how might a
Nollan/Dolan violation work in the context of a permit denial?
What prerequisites exist in that context to trigger Nollan/
Dolan, and what particular facts might an applicant allege to
state a valid claim? If a claim is successfully brought in that
context, what is the appropriate remedy? And what do the
answers to these micro-level questions suggest about macro-
level difficulties concerning the takings doctrine and Nollan/
Dolan's place within it?
I. OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE
As suggested above, the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence is widely regarded as among the most unclear
and confused doctrines in constitutional law, and it has been
this way more or less from the beginning. In perhaps the
earliest formulation of the doctrine, 41 Justice Holmes famously
39. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595-96; id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
40. Compare id. at 2603 ("We hold that the government's demand for property
from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and
Dolan ... even when its demand is for money."), with id. at 2603-04 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with this portion of majority's holding).
41. Perhaps fittingly, given the famous murkiness of the doctrine itself, the
precise origins of the regulatory takings doctrine is also the matter of some
debate. Compare, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002) ('[Ilt was Justice Holmes' opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that gave birth to our regulatory takings
jurisprudence.") (citation omitted), with James W. Ely, Jr., "Poor Relation" Once
More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2005
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 50 (calling this proposition "historically dubious" and
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wrote that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent," such regulation will be recognized as a taking if it
"goes too far."4 2 Not surprisingly, the Court has struggled to
explain precisely when that nebulous standard might be
violated, articulating a variety of testS43 that have frequently
incorporated elements of substantive due process into the
takings analysis.44 In 2005, however, with its unanimous
decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,45 the Court helped
bring some clarity to this area of constitutional inquiry.
A. The Lingle Framework
Lingle helped to clarify the law of regulatory takings in
three primary ways. First, the Court distinguished takings
claims from those grounded in substantive due process. The
latter challenge the purposes and legitimacy of government
action, the Court explained, and a regulation that is
sufficiently arbitrary or irrational under due process standards
will thus be invalidated. 46 The Takings Clause, by contrast,
presupposes the validity of the regulation at issue,47 and thus
focuses on the distinct problem of burden distribution-
whether the regulation, even though serving a valid purpose,
nonetheless "forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole." 48 For this reason, the remedy required by the
Takings Clause is not invalidation of the government's action
but is compensation to the person whose property has been
taken.49
stating that "jurists and commentators had long discussed whether regulations
might be so onerous as to have the practical effect of a physical taking").
42. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
43. See Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 68-77
(2008) (discussing Supreme Court's takings cases).
44. See id. at 68-69; see also Barros, supra note 3, at 352 (noting that
regulatory takings cases "have been infected with substantive due process
analysis"); Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process
from Takings Doctrine, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 373-87 (2006) (discussing
influence of substantive due process doctrine on regulatory takings
jurisprudence).
45. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
46. Id. at 543; see also id. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 543 (majority opinion).
48. Id. at 537 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
49. Id.
836 [Vol. 87
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Second, the Court sought to establish some intelligible
criteria by which a compensable taking might be identified.
"The paradigmatic taking," the Court explained, "is a direct
government appropriation or physical invasion of private
property."50 Thus, where the government seizes or occupies
private property, the Fifth Amendment requires that the owner
of that property receive compensation.5 1 In like fashion,
compensation is also required when the government acts in
some other manner-for example, by regulating private
property-that is "functionally equivalent" to an appropriation
or ouster. 52 The Court made clear that "functional equivalence"
is characterized by "the severity of the burden that government
imposes upon private property rights."53
Third, the Lingle Court authoritatively approved five of its
prior regulatory takings decisions as especially conforming to
the "functional equivalence" benchmark. 54 The decision in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. held that there
is always a compensable taking when government regulation
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of
her property. 55 In a similar manner, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council held that the government must generally
compensate for regulations that deprive an owner of all
economically beneficial use.56
Both of these tests, explained Lingle, accord with the
"functional equivalence" concept by focusing on the
burdensome effects of the regulations at issue. 57 There seems
to be no meaningful difference, for example, between the type
of regulation at issue in Loretto and a direct occupation by the
government; either action "effectively destroys" the traditional
rights of a property owner to possess, use, transfer, and
exclude.58 Likewise, a regulation that totally deprives an owner
of all beneficial use is, "from the landowner's point of view, the
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) and
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945)).
52. Id. at 539.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 538-39, 546-48.
55. 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
56. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1027-29 (1992).
57. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 ("[Elach of these tests focuses directly upon the
severity of the burden that government imposed upon private property rights.").
58. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36.
837
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equivalent of a physical appropriation," 59 probably because it
has the same effects on the owner's core rights. 60
And even the frustratingly amorphous balancing test
established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York 61 "turns in large part . . . upon the magnitude of a
regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it
interferes with legitimate property interests."62 Thus, whatever
difficulties that inhere in these decisions or the tests they
create, the unifying characteristic of all three is their focus on
the burdens imposed on private property by government
regulation.
B. Nollan/Dolan's Place in the Lingle Framework
The Lingle Court admitted, however, that the two other
decisions it endorsed-Nollan and Dolan-proved more
troublesome to defend on "functional equivalence" grounds. 63
For one thing, in both cases, the Court had drawn upon due
process precedents to support its conclusions. 64 For another,
the very questions asked by the analytical framework
established in Nollan and Dolan seem to focus, at least
partially, on due process concerns.
When the government conditions land use approval on an
exaction, Nollan/Dolan evaluates the constitutionality of the
exaction through the following inquiries: (1) Does the
government possess a sufficient interest to deny the application
outright? (2) If so, does the exaction bear an "essential nexus"
to that interest? (3) If so, is the exaction "roughly proportional"
to the impact that the proposed land use is expected to have on
that interest? 65 Because these questions speak about the
59. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 439-40 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017).
60. See Kent, supra note 43, at 90-92 (discussing total taking's effect on core
property rights).
61. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Under Penn Central, whether a government
regulation effects a taking depends on the court's assessment of three factors: (1)
the regulation's economic impact on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the
regulation interferes with the claimant's investment-backed expectations; and (3)
the character of the governmental action at issue. Id. at 124.
62. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
63. Id. at 546.
64. Id.
65. See Kent, supra note 43, at 102 (outlining parts of Nollan/Dolan
analysis); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-96 (1994) (discussing
'essential nexus" and "rough proportionality"); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
838 [Vol. 87
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sufficiency of the state's interest in imposing the challenged
exaction, as well as the relationship between the exaction and
the interest sought to be advanced, they more readily call to
mind Lingle's description of due process analyses than the
"functional equivalence" touchstone for a taking.66
Nonetheless, the Lingle Court made clear that it viewed
Nollan and Dolan as serving the same basic function as the
other approved takings tests-namely, evaluating whether
government regulation imposed burdens that, in their effects,
were analogous to a physical appropriation of property. 67 The
Court emphasized that both cases involved a government
demand for a public easement, which normally "would have
been a per se physical taking." 68 As such, the issue was not
whether the government had imposed a burden that was
tantamount to a direct appropriation-it unquestionably had-
but whether doing so in connection with a permit application
somehow made a difference. 69
In Nollan, the Court agreed that it might make a
difference in the right circumstances. 70 If, under its police
power, the government could exercise the greater authority of
denying the application, then it also could exercise the lesser
authority of conditioning its approval of the application, so long
as the condition served the same police power purpose as would
the denial.71 At the same time, however, Nollan recognized
that the context in which such conditions might be imposed
brought with it the temptation to leverage the police power
simply to gain concessions without having to pay for them.72
483 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1987) (discussing "essential nexus").
66. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exactions Takings, 33
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 189, 212 (2010) ("It appeared that both Nollan
and Dolan required application of the very analysis rejected [under the Takings
Clause] in Lingle. .. ."); Daniel Pollack, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court
Tries to Prune Agins Without Stepping on Nollan and Dolan, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q.
925, 929-30 (2006) ("At first blush, it appears that the Nollan and Dolan rules
subject government regulation to just the sort of means-ends inquiry now rejected
by the Lingle ruling.").
67. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-48.
68. Id. at 546.
69. Id. at 546-47.
70. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
71. See id. at 836 ("[Tihe Commission's assumed power to forbid construction
of the house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must surely include
the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner ... that
serves the same end.").
72. See id. at 837 ('[U]nless the permit condition serves the same
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The Nollan/Dolan inquiries are designed to balance these
concerns by allowing the government to exercise its police
power while simultaneously preventing the government from
skirting its constitutional obligation to compensate for property
it takes. Thus, the analysis starts by asking about the
governmental interests at stake.73 Although Nollan and Dolan
phrased the question in terms of legitimacy, Lingle made clear
that neither decision actually evaluated the state's proffered
interests on such grounds: "In neither case did the Court
question whether the exaction would substantially advance
some legitimate state interest." 74 Rather, in both cases, the
Court assumed that the interests advanced by the government
were valid.75 Accordingly, the first question under Nollan/
Dolan does not actually probe the reasons underlying the
exaction; it merely seeks to have the government articulate
those reasons and then accepts them as sufficient. 76
Nollan/Dolan's second question-nexus-likewise does not
test the validity of the government's stated purposes but seeks
to ensure that the exaction actually serves those purposes
rather than other (more nefarious) ones. 77 The same can be
said for Dolan's rough proportionality requirement, which
serves to limit the burdens imposed by the exaction-burdens
that otherwise would qualify as a taking per se-to those
necessary to advance the government's stated interest. 78
Thus, as explained by Lingle, the Nollan/Dolan
framework remains focused on the burdens government places
on property rights.79 In the specific context of those cases, the
burdens were sufficiently severe that, under different facts,
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."') (quoting
J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
73. Kent, supra note 43, at 102.
74. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
75. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1994); Nollan, 438 U.S.
at 834-35.
76. See Kent, supra note 28, at 1843 (describing this step as "an analytical
placeholder [rather] than an actual inquiry").
77. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 ("[Tihe issue was whether the exactions
substantially served the same interests that land-use authorities asserted would
allow them to deny the permit altogether.").
78. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (requiring that exaction be related "both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development").
79. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-48; see also Kent, supra note 43, at 102-06
(explaining Nollan/Dolan in terms of "functional equivalence").
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compensation would be required automatically.8 0 Any
discussion of governmental interests or purposes must be
viewed in that context, which raised unique concerns about the
government trading regulatory approvals in exchange for the
waiver of a constitutional right. For this reason, Lingle
highlighted Nollan/Dolan's status as "a special application of
the 'doctrine of unconstitutional conditions."' 8 1 That doctrine is
explored in the next Part.
II. OVERVIEW OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
As difficult as takings doctrine is to explain and apply, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine arguably is more difficult
still. Unlike takings cases, which all involve the same
constitutional provision and the same constitutional right, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been applied in a wide
variety of contexts. 82 The sheer range of its application thus
presents an obstacle to studying and understanding it.
Compounding the problem is the way the Court has
applied the doctrine, which has been plagued by a lack of
coherence both within and among the various contexts in which
the doctrine has surfaced.8 3 This lack of coherence necessarily
hinders attempts, both theoretical and practical, "to separate
the constitutional from the unconstitutional." 84
Finally, whereas the unanimous opinion in Lingle sought
to bring at least minimal order to the assorted strands of
takings jurisprudence,8 5 the Court has undertaken no similar
attempt to unify its unconstitutional conditions cases. As such,
the principles and concepts that the Court itself views to be
most important about the doctrine remain somewhat obscure. 86
80. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
81. Id. at 547 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385).
82. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 807
(2003) (listing contexts in which doctrine has been applied); see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 9 (1993) (stating that the doctrine is not
"anchored to any single clause of the Constitution," but "roams about
constitutional law like Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but not in others").
83. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that the Court's "failure to
provide coherent guidance on the subject is, alas, legendary"); Sullivan, supra
note 6, at 1416 (stating that application of doctrine "is riven with
inconsistencies").
84. Berman, supra note 9, at 8.
85. See supra Section I.A.
86. See Hamburger, supra note 5, at 487 ("The cases on unconstitutional
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Despite these difficulties, however, a brief review of some
of the cases in which the Court has employed the doctrine helps
to identify a few important themes. 87 In particular, tracing the
development of the doctrine from its early iterations yields the
conclusion that the Court has most often emphasized problems
arising from governmental coercion, as well as improper
motives and effects.
A. Early Unconstitutional Conditions Cases
1. Governmental Coercion
Early applications of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine hinted that the problem might be one of consent-that
is, whether the waiver of a constitutional right was made
voluntarily or resulted instead from some type of coercion or
duress. When a Wisconsin statute required out-of-state
insurance companies to agree that they would not remove
lawsuits from Wisconsin courts to federal courts, for example,
the Court voided both the agreement and the statute as
infringing the companies' "absolute right" to removal.88 The
Court began with the dubious proposition that "[a] man may
not barter away . .. his substantial rights," 89 but it quickly
suggested that the real problem was the nature and scope of
the particular agreement before it.
Although the foreign corporation could consent to forego
removal in a given case, the Court doubted that an ex ante
agreement to "forfeit [its] rights at all times and on all
occasions" could truly be considered consensual. 90 And this was
doubly true, it seemed, where the agreement was required by
conditions are so poorly conceptualized that they cannot provide more than rough
support for any theory of such conditions . . . .").
87. By focusing on cases that apply the doctrine to invalidate a law or
regulation, I am admittedly providing only half the story and, thereby, avoiding
some of the doctrine's more troublesome features. Indeed, many of the difficulties
with the doctrine lie not in the decisions that have applied it but, rather, in
squaring those decisions with others where the Court has refused to do so. But my
goal here is neither to provide a comprehensive appraisal of the doctrine nor to
bring absolute clarity to the Court's mercurial appeals to it. Instead, I aim merely
to sketch its most basic aspects in the hope that some shared ideas common to
those cases where it has been applied might be extracted.
88. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 458 (1874).
89. Id. at 451.
90. Id.
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statute before the company could transact any business.91 The
Court conceded that Wisconsin possessed the authority both to
exclude foreign corporations altogether and to allow them
within the state subject to reasonable conditions. 92 But to make
corporations affirmatively agree in advance not to exercise a
right guaranteed to them went beyond the constitutional
pale. 93
2. Improper Purpose and Effect
Perhaps mindful of the Court's imprecise distinction
between agreements and conditions, other states decided to
approach the issue not through ex ante stipulation but rather
by making removal to federal court a basis for revoking a
business license already issued. In these cases, while not
renouncing its earlier notions of voluntariness, the Court
emphasized the improper purposes that underlay such
statutes.
In Barron v. Burnside, for example, the Court noted that
"the entire purpose" of the offending statute was "to deprive the
foreign corporation . . . of the right conferred upon it by the
Constitution and laws of the United States . . . ."94 In Terral u.
Burke Construction Co., the Court similarly reproved "state
action . . . necessarily calculated to curtail the free exercise of'
the corporation's constitutional rights. 95 Because the states
could not directly strip foreign corporations of their right to
remove or make those corporations agree in advance not to
exercise that right, the Court seemed to be saying, they
likewise could not impose conditions that reached the same
results by a more circuitous route. 96
91. See id. at 454-55.
92. Id. at 455-56.
93. Id. at 458. But see Doyle v. Cont'I Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 542 (1876),
overruled by Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532-33 (1922) (refusing to
enjoin revocation of license, under same Wisconsin statute, issued to foreign
corporation that had removed case to federal court).
94. 121 U.S. 186, 197 (1887).
95. 257 U.S. at 532. Terral also noted that the Court had rendered conflicting
decisions on the issue and explicitly overruled those that could not be reconciled
with its holding. See id. at 532-33.
96. See Barron, 121 U.S. at 200 (implicitly comparing condition imposed on
foreign corporation to statute directly depriving foreign citizens of removal rights).
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B. The Court's Decision in Frost
What was intimated in these earlier cases the Court made
clear in Frost v. Railroad Commission.97 There, the Court
considered the validity of a California statute regulating the
use of the state's highways by certain transporters. 98 Under the
statute as originally written, common carriers were required to
obtain a certificate of public convenience as a condition of
utilizing the public highways. 99 An amendment to the statute
later extended these requirements to transporters that were
not common carriers but, rather, conveyed persons or goods
under private contracts.100 When one private carrier was
ordered to cease operations because it had not acquired the
necessary certificate, the carrier challenged the statute as
effectively converting it into a common carrier in violation of its
constitutional rights. 101 The Supreme Court agreed. 102
1. Governmental Coercion
Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland began with
the proposition, expressed in prior cases, that "a private carrier
cannot be converted against his will into a common carrier by
mere legislative command."103 The question, then, was whether
California could do by condition what it clearly could not do by
edict. 104
In answering, the Court first called attention to the lack of
meaningful choice afforded to the private carrier.105 Although
in form the statute looked like a conditional offer that the
company could accept or reject as it chose, the majority viewed
the substance of the situation to be quite different. 106 "In
reality," Justice Sutherland explained, "the carrier is given no
choice, except a choice between the rock and the whirlpool-an
option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood
97. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
98. Id. at 589.
99. Id. at 589-90.
100. Id. at 590.
101. Id. at 590-91.
102. Id. at 599-600.
103. Id. at 592.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 593.
106. Id.
844 [Vol. 87
2016] EXACTIONS THROUGH ANTI-EVASION PRISM
or submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable
burden." 107 Thus, to the extent that a private carrier submitted
itself to the statutory requirements, such submission could not
really be considered a voluntary waiver of its rights.
2. Improper Purpose and Effect
In addition, the Court was wary of the purposes that
California sought to accomplish. Rejecting the notion that the
state's statute was a simple regulation of the public roads,10 8
Justice Sutherland saw it instead as an attempt to skirt the
constitutional limitations otherwise placed on the government:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of
state legislation which, by words of express divestment,
seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result
is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in
exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens
otherwise to withhold. . . . It is inconceivable that
guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United
States may thus be manipulated out of existence. 10 9
Thus, irrespective of California's authority otherwise to
regulate its roadways or impose conditions on privileges it
chose to grant, the purpose underlying this condition, as well
as its potential effects, rendered it unconstitutional. 1 10
C. The Court's Modern Decisions
Although the Court's application of the doctrine has been
anything but clear, where it has been applied, the Court
routinely returns to these themes of coercion, purpose, and
effects. Thus, when California conditioned receipt of a tax
exemption on an oath not to advocate the forceful overthrow of
the government, the Court struck down the condition as unduly
107. Id.
108. Id. at 591.
109. Id. at 593-94 (emphases added).
110. See also id. at 599 ('Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when
done to accomplish an unlawful end, and a constitutional power cannot be used by
way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result.") (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910)).
845
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
coercing the waiver of free speech rights,111 which the state
could not have accomplished directly. 112 When Arkansas
conditioned employment as a public school or college teacher on
the annual disclosure of every organization to which the
teacher belonged or contributed during the past five years, the
Court found that the statute put undue pressure on teachers to
waive their associational rights113 and raised implicit questions
about the purposes served by the requirement. 114 And when
Congress conditioned the continued receipt of all Medicaid
funds on the states agreeing to a vast expansion of the
program, seven members of the Court found that the statute
effectively strong-armed the states into waiving their
sovereignty and serving as agents of the federal government.115
Whatever the exact boundaries of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the foregoing decisions reveal a general
wariness about the government leveraging its discretion to
grant or deny benefits when constitutional rights are at stake.
At least in certain circumstances, 116 this wariness can prove
fatal, with the Court heavily scrutinizing, and even
invalidating, conditions that the government attaches to the
benefits it distributes. As a general proposition, then, the
doctrine constrains the government from conditioning a
benefit-even one it has no obligation to provide and could
otherwise withhold altogether-if the condition is designed to
or has the effect of coercing the waiver of a constitutional
111. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) ("[Tlhe denial of a tax
exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of
coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech.").
112. See id. at 526 (faulting the statute for "necessarily produc[ing] a result
which the State could not command directly").
113. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960) ("[T]he pressure upon
a teacher to avoid any ties which might displease those who control his
professional destiny would be constant and heavy.").
114. See id. at 486 (noting that, because Arkansas had no tenure system for
teachers, the "interference with personal freedom is conspicuously accented
[because] the teacher serves at the absolute will of those to whom the disclosure
must be made"); id. at 488 (stating that many of the relationships required to be
disclosed "could have no possible bearing upon the teacher's occupational
competence or fitness").
115. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (describing the condition as "a gun
to the head"); id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("If
the anticoercion rule does not apply in this case, then there is no such rule.").
116. Again, determining precisely which cases are likely to receive this
scrutiny-differentiating those that do from those that do not proves to be one of
the major sticking points with the doctrine.
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right. 117
D. The Function of Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Although it remains the Court's principal explanation for
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the coercion theory
has been widely criticized by legal scholars.118 Whatever its
strengths or shortcomings as an explanatory device, however, I
think it reveals something very important about the function of
the doctrine. As demonstrated above, in many of the doctrine's
formative cases, the Court linked the problem of coercion to the
problem of circumvention. 119 Put differently, the lack of
meaningful choice accompanying a waiver of rights was
thought to expose the government's true motivation in
imposing the condition, which was to sidestep a prohibition on
direct action through indirect action that accomplished the
same goal. 120
When understood in these terms, some of the Court's
discussions of coercion make a bit more sense. In Frost, for
example, California knew that it could not directly compel a
transporter to assume the obligations of a common carrier, so
instead it conditioned the use of its highways on the company's
"agreement" to do so, thus jeopardizing the transporter's
continued viability if it did not acquiesce. 121 NFIB v. Sebelius
can be viewed in similar terms: Unable to make the states
enact federally-preferred legislation, Congress instead imposed
burdensome conditions on the receipt of federal funding, thus
117. See EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 5 (providing "canonical' definition of
unconstitutional conditions doctrine along these lines); see also Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) (stating that
unconstitutional conditions cases "reflect an overarching principle . . . that
vindicates the Constitution's enumerated rights by preventing the government
from coercing people into giving them up").
118. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 12-15; Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v.
City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 859,
859-60 (1995); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1428-56. But see Berman, supra note 9,
at 12-47 (discussing conventional wisdom against coercion theories but arguing in
favor of alternative understanding of coercion).
119. See supra Sections II.A.-II.C.
120. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519, 526 (1958); Frost v. R.R.
Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 592-93 (1926). Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. &
Inst. Rights, Inc. 547 U.S. 47, 59-60 (2006) (finding no unconstitutional conditions
problem where direct congressional action would have been authorized).
121. See Frost, 271 U.S. at 593 ('In reality, the carrier is given no choice,
except a choice between the rock and the whirlpool. . . .").
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endangering the states' reliance interests in programs already
underway1 22 and exposing state taxpayers to politically
unpalatable tax increases. 123 In these and similar scenarios,
the Court seems to regard the coercive nature of the conditions
as part and parcel of an overarching attempt to thwart
constitutional limitations.
Accordingly, the primary role of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is to prevent governmental attempts to
evade constitutional requirements despite formal compliance
with the Court's prior pronouncements. It is, in other words,
what Brannon Denning and I call an "anti-evasion doctrine" (or
"AED"). 124 And in this regard, it serves the same basic function
as the Court's regulatory takings tests, which we previously
have described "as an elaborate body of AEDs." 125
III. TAKINGS, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS, AND ANTI-
EVASION
In this Part, I provide a brief overview of anti-evasion
doctrines and the reasons Denning and I have posited for their
creation-specifically, the justices' perceptions that political
safeguards are inadequate to enforce the constitutional
principle at stake. I then demonstrate how both regulatory
takings doctrine and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
fit within the AED model.
A. Anti-Evasion Doctrines and Political Safeguards
In the past several years, a number of scholars have
focused upon how the Supreme Court performs its role in
122. See Nat'i Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604-05 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (noting that potential loss of all Medicaid
funding would jeopardize "intricate statutory and administrative regimes
[developed by the states] over the course of many decades to implement their
objectives under existing Medicaid").
123. See id. at 2661-62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(worrying that "States may, as a practical matter, be unable to refuse to
participate in the federal program" because "withdrawal would likely force the
State to impose a huge tax increase on its residents, and this new state tax would
come on top of the federal taxes already paid by residents to support subsidies to
participating States").
124. See Denning & Kent, supra note 37, at 1779 (defining "anti-evasion
doctrine").
125. Id. at 1795.
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deciding constitutional cases. 126 Whereas more conventional
accounts depict that role as centering on the Court's
interpretative function, this alternative school points out that
interpretation is only the initial step in the Court's
adjudicatory work. 127 After the Court performs that step-
determining the "constitutional operative propositions"-it
then performs a second step, in which it implements those
propositions through the formation and application of
"constitutional decision rules." 128 Because constitutional
principles are frequently "framed at a relatively high level of
generality," the decision rules operate akin to "intermediating
regulations that get applied to particular situations to resolve
actual cases." 129
When one carefully examines how the Court applies these
decision rules, a pattern emerges. In a number of different
contexts, the Court initially implements a constitutional
proposition through a decision rule that typically takes the
form of an ex ante rule and often tends to track the proposition
itself.130 After this initial decision rule is established, those
actors intended to be bound by it begin to develop ways to
evade its limitations, and this characteristically occurs through
efforts to formally comply with the rule while substantively
violating the proposition it was designed to enforce. 13 1 When
these efforts are subsequently challenged, the Court then
augments the initial decision rule with another decision rule-
typically taking the form of an ex post standard-aimed at
curbing the evasive conduct and protecting the constitutional
proposition from it. 132
The Court tends to frame these AEDs as one of four types
of constitutional "tests." First, they frequently are packaged as
"pretext tests," which ask whether the government is, under
126. See id. at 1775 n.6 (citing examples).
127. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9
(2004); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output
Thesis, 119 HARv L. REV. F. 220, 221 (2006) [hereinafter Berman, Two-Output
Thesis].
128. Berman, Two-Output Thesis, supra note 127, at 9.
129. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Judicial Doctrine as Risk
Regulation, 82 TENN. L. REV. 405, 409 (2015).
130. Denning & Kent, supra note 37, at 1793.
131. Id. at 1827.
132. Id. at 1793, 1827. As Denning and I explain, we think this is the usual
pattern revealed in the Court's decisions, even though there are exceptions-
which we deem largely immaterial in certain doctrinal contexts. See id. at 1793.
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the guise of achieving some purpose permitted by the
Constitution, really attempting to do something that the
Constitution disallows. 133 Second, they are structured as "proxy
tests," "which ferret out regulations that depend on a
purportedly neutral characteristic, but in reality use that
characteristic as a proxy for some other, prohibited
characteristic." 134 Third, AEDs take the form of "purpose tests,"
asking whether government action is motivated by
"constitutionally illegitimate reasons."135 Finally, they appear
as "effects tests," which give attention to the consequences of
government action rather than its content. 136
Although these tests focus on slightly different criteria,
they seek to address the same basic problem-evasion of
constitutional principles-by performing the same basic
function-preventing government actors from elevating form
over constitutional substance. "Put differently, AEDs attempt
to optimize constitutional enforcement by ensuring that
governmental officials cannot easily evade or undermine
constitutional commands by manipulating gaps left open in the
decision rules developed to implement those commands." 137
Given the role played by AEDs in optimizing constitutional
enforcement, it is noteworthy that the Court does not employ
them in all circumstances. As Denning and I have explained,
there are times-such as its rejection of disparate treatment
claims under the Equal Protection Clause 138-where the Court
conspicuously refuses to apply an AED (a phenomenon that we
term "anti-anti-evasion"). 139 In light of this phenomenon, the
question becomes why the Court utilizes AEDs in some cases
but not in others.
Although there may be a number of valid answers to that
question, 140 part of the explanation seems to depend on how
"risky," in terms of endangering various constitutional
principles, the justices perceive a given action to be. 141 Where
133. Id. at 1780.
134. Denning & Kent, supra note 38, at 399.
135. Denning & Kent, supra note 37, at 1780 (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 79 (2001)).
136. Id.
137. Denning & Kent, supra note 38, at 399.
138. Id. at 411-14.
139. Id. at 399-400.
140. See, e.g., id. at 416-21 (cataloguing and discussing Court's stated
reasons).
141. See Denning & Kent, supra note 129, at 418-25 (arguing that doctrinal
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the risks are relatively low, for example, the Court is more
likely to develop and employ decision rules that defer to the
political branches (classic rational basis scrutiny, for
example). 142 Where the Court perceives the challenged activity
to pose greater risks, however, it is more apt to scrutinize the
law or regulation at issue (such as in its employment of strict
scrutiny). 143 Thus, the Court's decision rules "occupy points
along a deference spectrum," with "[t]he transition from more
to less deference reflect[ing] a corresponding rise in perceived
level of risk to constitutional principle by official action." 144
In this telling, it is important to note that the perceived
risk of governmental injury to the constitutional norm is
connected to the amount and type of judicial intervention that
the Court chooses to employ. Accordingly, when confronted
with a potential constitutional violation, the selection of a
decision rule appears to be influenced not only by the nature
and effect of the conduct being challenged but also by the need
for and consequences of judicial action itself. The Court must
decide whether the conduct in question poses sufficient risk to
warrant weighty judicial involvement, which comes with
attendant risks of its own.
The decision whether or not to employ an AED can be
viewed in similar terms. When the Court encounters official
conduct that conforms to a prior decision rule but nonetheless
is alleged to evade the constitutional principle underlying that
rule, it essentially has two choices. Either it can defer to the
government and uphold the action as constitutional under the
initial decision rule (that is, not employ an AED), or it can
create a supplementary decision rule that more closely
scrutinizes the conduct in question (that is, employ an AED).
The path the Court chooses appears to be influenced by how
the justices assess the risks involved. 145
Of particular importance to this risk assessment, Denning
and I argue, is the existence of political safeguards that can be
formation results, in part, from justices' perceptions of, and attempts to manage,
risk to constitutional propositions posed by government action).
142. Id. at 419.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 409 (arguing that "selection of decision rules-either initially or
subsequently (as in the case of AEDs)-should be understood as judicial efforts to
regulate . . . the public risk [of] violation of constitutional principles by
government officials").
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expected to adequately prevent governmental overreaching, at
least when compared to the prospect of judicial intervention. 146
When robust process protections are available to defend the
boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct, the
need for additional judicial protections is minimized. Indeed, it
might be that additional judicial scrutiny would produce more
harm than good, over-enforcing certain constitutional norms
instead of optimizing them. 147 Thus, where "there are sturdy
political safeguards that adequately monitor and enforce the
relevant constitutional principle better than would a judicially
crafted decision rule," 148 the Court appears to be less eager to
utilize an AED.
B. Regulatory Takings as Anti-Evasion Doctrine
The AED model, without reconciling every inconsistency or
explaining away all confusion, helps to bring a more coherent
shape to the doctrine of regulatory takings. As an initial
matter, it is helpful to note that the Court's takings
jurisprudence largely follows the pattern described above.
Early decisions basically tracked the rule-like text of the
Takings Clause1 49 by requiring the government to provide
compensation whenever it takes private property. 150 Moreover,
at least some decisions reinforced the rule-like nature of the
restriction by applying it "only to a direct appropriation, and
not to consequential injuries [to property] resulting from the
exercise of [some other] lawful power." 151
The problem with such a rule, of course, is that it can
easily be evaded. Rather than appropriate property outright,
the government might accomplish the same objectives by
regulating property in a manner that equally frustrates the
rights of the owner. In this way, the government might avoid
its obligation to pay compensation simply by taking an indirect,
146. Denning & Kent, supra note 38, at 424.
147. Id.; see also Denning & Kent, supra note 37, at 1814 (noting that maximal
constitutional protections "might entail a ... stifling of innovation that can make
government run more efficiently, increase public safety, enhance national
security, or provide sought-after public goods").
148. Denning & Kent, supra note 38, at 432.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. V ('[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.").
150. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
336-37 (1893).
151. See, e.g., Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871).
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rather than a direct, course.
The Court seemed to recognize this reality in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, where it was confronted with a
Pennsylvania statute that regulated coal-mining operations. 152
Specifically, the statute forbade the mining of coal in such a
manner as to cause the subsidence of structures or
improvements on the surface.153 The state justified the
prohibition on grounds that it served a public interest-
presumably safety 154-and the Court did not disagree that such
was the case. Indeed, the majority assumed not only the
existence of a public interest, but one that would have
authorized the state to condemn the mineral rights under its
power of eminent domain. 155
But that was precisely the problem. Because Pennsylvania
had not directly appropriated the mineral estate, it was not
required to compensate the owner under the Court's previous
decision rules. 156  The statute, however, effectively
accomplished the same thing as a direct appropriation-
specifically, it abolished a private estate in land for the benefit
of the public at large. 157 Admitting that the state possessed the
authority to regulate property, the majority nonetheless held
that such regulation could not go "too far" and had gone "too
far" in this case. 158
Mahon, of course, offered no meaningful guidance for
subsequent takings cases. A standard that prohibits a
regulation from going "too far" does not lend itself to reliable
application or predictable results. But Mahon suggests much
about the concerns that underlie takings doctrine. The
constitutional guarantee of just compensation is undermined,
the Court seemed to say, if it depends entirely on formalistic
distinctions between appropriation and regulation. A decision
rule that cuts so precisely is too easily manipulated and leaves
an enforcement gap that government officials can exploit to
disregard the right at issue. In Mahon, the Court signaled that
it would close that gap by treating regulation and
appropriation the same way in cases where they produced the
152. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
153. Id. at 412.
154. See id. at 420 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing safety rationale).
155. Id. at 416.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 414.
158. Id. at 415-16.
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same effects. What's more, the Court's amorphous standard left
open the possibility that any regulation might be found to go
"too far," thus keeping government officials honest by making
the consequences of their conduct less certain. 159
The Court's modern takings jurisprudence operates in
similar fashion. As noted in Part I, the touchstone inquiry
under current takings analysis is whether a regulation is
"functionally equivalent" to a direct appropriation. 160 The tests
that most readily conform to this standard-Loretto, 161
Lucas,162 and Penn Central1 63 -operate as effects tests that
evaluate the similarities between burdens imposed by the
challenged regulation and those that would be occasioned by
outright seizure. 164 The overarching point of this evaluation is
the same as it was in Mahon-namely, to make sure the
government provides compensation not only for the direct
appropriation of private property but also for its indirect
appropriation via regulation that produces the same results.
The same anti-evasion principle animates the Nollan/
Dolan test as well, although it takes a slightly different form.
Unlike the other tests, Nollan/Dolan's nexus and
proportionality requirements are not designed to evaluate the
effects of the government's conduct, which are evident. Had the
government in those cases simply demanded the easements at
issue, rather than make them conditions for obtaining
regulatory approval, compensation clearly would have been
required. 165 The effects of the condition were tantamount to an
outright seizure of an easement across the owner's land. The
question, as explained above, was whether the unique
regulatory context in which the conditions arose somehow
made those effects defensible. 166 Because the conditions were
159. See Denning & Kent, supra note 37, at 1801-02 (noting that AEDs "blur
the sharp edges of rules with the uncertainty and unpredictability of standards,
thus raising costs to governmental actors that would use a rule's clarity and
precision to undermine the constitutional principle the rule was intended to
enforce").
160. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
161. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
162. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
163. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
164. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); see also Denning
& Kent, supra note 37, at 1792 (identifying regulatory takings tests as effects
tests).
165. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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justified as mitigation measures for otherwise intolerable land
use projects, the nexus and proportionality requirements
resembled pretext or proxy tests that ensured the governments'
stated reasons for the conditions were not simply attempts to
obtain the easements without paying for them. 167
It remains true that the Court's takings tests are not in all
respects cohesive, 168 and the Court itself has conceded that
many "vexing subsidiary questions" exist.169 All the same, anti-
evasion serves as a predominant theme in the Court's decision
rules and helps to explain what the doctrine fundamentally is
about-"checking governmental efforts to evade the
constitutional requirement to pay just compensation for the
taking of private property." 170
At this point, of course, the question becomes why the
Court is so concerned about these efforts. As previously
mentioned, the Court refuses to utilize AEDs in some other
constitutional areas, so what makes the Takings Clause
different? The answer appears to be the inadequacy of political
safeguards that might otherwise curb evasive conduct. 171
Where it has declined to create AEDs, the Court hints that the
political process can defend the constitutional principle better,
or at least as passably, as can additional layers of judicial
167. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) ("[Tihe lack
of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction
converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then
becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement ... without payment of
compensation."); see also Denning & Kent, supra note 37, at 1777 (suggesting that
Nollan/Dolan might be a pretext test); id. at 1787 (describing Nollan/Dolan in
terms of a proxy test).
168. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (admitting that "our regulatory takings
jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified").
169. Id.
170. Denning & Kent, supra note 37, at 1824.
171. Several scholars have noted the connection between the Takings Clause
and the Court's takings decisions, on the one hand, and political process failure,
on the other. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9
CONST. COMMENT. 279, 306-07 (1992) (suggesting that Takings Clause operates
as check on discriminatory actions against politically disfavored groups); Kent,
supra note 28, at 1863-65 (discussing process failure in context of land use
exactions); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 855 (1995) (positing that
remedying process failure was original purpose of the Takings Clause); see also
Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of
Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 699-702 (discussing
political process theory but finding it inadequate to explain Court's takings
decisions).
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protection. 172 For example, when the Court refused to treat tax
credits the same as direct appropriations under the
Establishment Clause, it grounded its decision, in part, on
concerns about the proper judicial role. 173 When the Court
declined to create an AED for funding conditions that allegedly
undermined the right to an abortion recognized by Roe v.
Wade,174 it touted the role of the political branches, as well as
the judiciary, in preserving constitutional guarantees. 175 These
examples demonstrate not only that the Court believes it
should sometimes stay its hand but also that there are
acceptable means of guarding constitutional principles apart
from judicial intervention. 176
In areas like regulatory takings, however, the Court's
assessment is different. Here, the cases suggest that the Court
does not trust whatever political safeguards may be in place. 177
172. See generally Denning & Kent, supra note 38, at 422-31 (discussing
political safeguards hypothesis).
173. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 145-46 (2011)
("Few exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public
confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts
the Court in the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to
invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagrees with them.").
174. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
175. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) ("We should not forget that
'legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in
quite as great a degree as the courts."') (quoting Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May,
194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
176. See Denning & Kent, supra note 38, at 424 ("By ceding the enforcement
role to these other institutions . . . the Court signals its confidence that the
protections provided by the political processes are sufficient to prevent grave
abuses.").
177. This distrust of the political process vis-a-vis regulatory takings may be
misplaced given the legislative response to the Court's decision about the use of
eminent domain in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In response
to that decision's broad and deferential reading of the Fifth Amendment's "public
use" language to allow the taking of private property for economic development,
forty-two states enacted legislation or adopted amendments to their own
constitutions to curb the practice. See James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the
Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty?, 17 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 133 (2009). In light
of this response, perhaps the Court should trust the political process more when it
comes to takings issues. On the other hand, at least one study concluded that,
despite all of this legislative activity, "the Kelo uprising has led to little
substantive limitation on states' eminent domain authority," Marc Mihaly &
Turner Smith, Kelo's Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative and
Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 703, 729 (2011), suggesting
that the political process may not work that well after all to curb takings abuses.
Whether the Court's judgment about process sufficiency in this area is sound
presents an interesting question, but one that exceeds the scope of my purposes
here.
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Consider again the Court's opinion in Mahon.178 Justice
Holmes noted explicitly that the Constitution presupposes a
public necessity or purpose for the property taken, but it
nonetheless obligates the government to compensate the
owner. 179 And this obligation to compensate exists, he pointed
out, even when the need for the property is quite strong. 180 The
mere invocation of a police power purpose does not in itself
negate the compensation requirement because, were that the
rule, "the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private
property disappears." 181
This same notion is echoed in the Court's more recent
explanations that the Takings Clause serves to prevent the
government from compelling a particular individual or group to
bear burdens that should be borne by society as a whole. 182
Human nature being what it is, the Court seems to be saying
that the defense of the compensation right cannot be left to the
voters and taxpayers, most of whom are more than happy to
shift whatever costs they can onto others.183 Because the
political process is unlikely to curb (and, indeed, may
encourage) attempts to evade the takings protections, the
Court's intervention is required.
C. Unconstitutional Conditions as Anti-Evasion Doctrine
As with takings, the perceived need to curtail evasion of
constitutional principles serves as the leading characteristic of
the Court's unconstitutional conditions cases. Having already
178. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
179. Id. at 415.
180. See id. at 416 (noting the existence of "exigency" that would warrant
statute being challenged).
181. Id. at 415.
182. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
183. Some state tribunals applying the Court's takings decisions have utilized
just this rationale. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal.
1996) ("In a context in which the constraints imposed by legislative and political
processes are absent or substantially reduced, the risk of too elastic or diluted a
takings standard the vice of distributive injustice in the allocation of civic
costs-is heightened. . . ."); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship,
135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex. 2004) ("[Wle think it entirely possible that the
government could 'gang up' on particular groups to force extractions that a
majority of constituents would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens
they would otherwise bear were shifted to others.").
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laid much of the groundwork for this argument in the
preceding sections, I offer here a few observations to bring the
argument to fruition.
First, the factual contexts in which unconstitutional
conditions most characteristically arise offer an ideal setting
for evasive behavior. As Philip Hamburger has explained, "the
Constitution typically protects liberty by limiting government
constraints, not government benefits." 184 The Constitution, in
other words, explicitly restrains the government from negating
certain rights-"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech,"185 for example-but it provides only
minimal direction about government largesse.1 86 For this
reason, conditions on benefits doled out by the government
often escape the scrutiny that applies to more overt
obstructions of rights. "By casting restrictions on liberty in
terms of conditions rather than direct constraints," Hamburger
continues, "the government can escape not only its limited
powers but also most of the limits on such powers, including
most of the Bill of Rights." 187
Second, as already discussed, evasion of constitutional
norms is a frequent concern in the Court's unconstitutional
conditions cases. In Speiser v. Randall, for example, the Court
advised that the problem with the offensive condition was that
it "must necessarily produce a result which the State could not
command directly." 188 The Court repeated that concern in Perry
v. Sindermann, where it utilized an effects test to evaluate the
state's nonrenewal of an outspoken college professor who had
criticized the state board of regents. 189 'I]f the government
184. Hamburger, supra note 5, at 491.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
186. Professor Hamburger observes that the Establishment Clause does
address government benefits by barring subsidies and other types of assistance to
religion. See Hamburger, supra note 5, at 491. The Equal Protection Clause might
provide another example; although the government may not be required to
provide a particular benefit, if it chooses to do so, it must provide the benefit in a
non-discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.
City, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955), affd 350 U.S. 877 (1955); cf Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971) (acknowledging that the city had no
affirmative duty to operate municipal swimming pools, but implying that
Constitution would still be violated if "whites [were] permitted to use public
facilities while blacks [were] denied access" or if the city maintained "different
sets of facilities for blacks and whites").
187. Hamburger, supra note 5, at 492.
188. 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
189. 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
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could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations," Justice Stewart wrote for the
majority, "his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be
penalized and inhibited." 190
Anti-evasion principles also informed the Court's decision
to invalidate a requirement that recipients of federal funds,
under a program to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, agree that
they were opposed to prostitution and sex trafficking. 191 Noting
that the requirement would "plainly violate the First
Amendment" if "enacted as a direct regulation of speech," 192
the Court held that its unconstitutional effects were the same
even though framed as a spending condition. "By demanding
that funding recipients adopt-as their own-the Government's
view on an issue of public concern," explained the Court, "the
condition by its very nature affects 'protected conduct outside
the scope of the federally funded program."' 193
Perhaps the clearest use of the anti-evasion rationale
occurs in Justice Sutherland's opinion in Frost.194 Observing
that the state could not directly convert a private transporter
into a common carrier, Sutherland articulated the question as
"whether the state may bring about the same result by
imposing the unconstitutional requirement as a condition
precedent to the enjoyment of a privilege." 195 For the majority
of the Court, that question had to be answered negatively. 196
Otherwise, Justice Sutherland explained, "constitutional
guaranties, so carefully safeguarded against direct assault, are
open to destruction by the indirect, but no less effective,
process of requiring a surrender, which, though in form
voluntary, in fact lacks none of the elements of compulsion." 197
Allowing the state to evade constitutional norms in this way
imperiled not only the rights of the individual carrier at issue,
or even those of other private carriers similarly situated. 198 The
risks involved were more systemic. "If the state may compel the
190. Id. at 597.
191. Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321
(2013).
192. Id. at 2327.
193. Id. at 2330 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)).
194. Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
195. Id. at 592.
196. Id. at 593-94.
197. Id. at 593.
198. See id. at 594.
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surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor,"
Sutherland warned, "it may, in like manner compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded
in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence." 199
As a third and final observation, many of the Court's
unconstitutional conditions cases, like its takings cases,
contain clues that it views the political process as inadequate
to protect the right at issue. A recurring theme in the decisions
that apply the doctrine is that the challenged condition, if
allowed, might be used to harm persons or groups outside the
political mainstream. The requirement in Shelton v. Tucker
that public school teachers list their associations, for example,
ran the risk of those associations being publicly exposed,
"bringing with it the possibility of public pressures upon school
boards to discharge teachers who belong to unpopular or
minority organizations . . . ."200
A similar concern appears to have been at work in Sherbert
v. Verner, where the state denied unemployment benefits to a
Seventh Day Adventist because she refused to accept work on
Saturdays. 201 In reversing that denial, the Court specifically
noted that the state's employment statutes contained
exemptions for employees opposed to working on Sundays-
presumably, the more mainstream view-thus "expressly
sav[ing] the Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind
of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian's
religious liberty."202 Implicit in these discussions is an
apprehension that identifiable out-groups, whose members
"might not be able to activate the normal safeguards that
restrain simple majorities," 203 are particularly at risk.204
199. Id.
200. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960).
201. 374 U.S. 398, 399-401 (1963).
202. Id. at 406.
203. Denning & Kent, supra note 129, at 438.
204. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 411 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Miany people
hold beliefs alien to the majority of our society beliefs that are protected by the
First Amendment but which could easily be trod upon under the guise of 'police' or
'health' regulations reflecting the majority's views.").
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D. Summary
The function of AEDs is to optimize constitutional
enforcement by preventing government officials from indirectly
accomplishing a goal that would be constitutionally forbidden if
accomplished directly. Both regulatory takings and the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions bear the traits of AEDs,
and (as with other AEDs) the Court tends to utilize them when
it believes that political safeguards do not adequately protect
the constitutional values at stake in a given case.
For this reason, it should come as no surprise that anti-
evasion concepts abound in the Court's exactions
jurisprudence, where the doctrines of regulatory takings and
unconstitutional conditions intersect. Indeed, anti-evasion and
political safeguards feature prominently in both the majority
and dissenting opinions in Koontz-the Court's most recent
exactions case-as the next Part demonstrates.
IV. ANTI-EVASION IN KooNTZ
The foregoing discussion placed the Nollan/Dolan
standard within the AED model, explaining that it was
designed largely to prevent the government from evading the
per se classification of permanent physical invasions as
compensable takings. This Part takes the conversation a step
further by demonstrating that the Court's extension of the
Nollan/Dolan framework in Koontz, as well as the dissent's
quarrel with that extension, can likewise be understood in
terms of anti-evasion.
A. Background of the Litigation
Coy Koontz owned an approximately fifteen-acre parcel of
Florida land, most of which was classified as wetlands under
state law.205 As a result of this classification, the land could not
be developed without first obtaining a Wetlands Resource
Management permit, which required the applicant to provide
the state with reasonable assurance that any proposed
construction would not adversely affect the public interests
205. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591-
92 (2013).
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served by the wetlands. 206 Koontz applied for a permit in
conjunction with his plans to develop approximately four acres
of the parcel.207 To meet his obligation of providing "reasonable
assurance," Koontz offered to deed to the local water
management district a conservation easement for the
remaining eleven acres. 208
The district rejected the conservation easement as
inadequate and informed Koontz that it would issue the permit
only if he agreed to one of two alternative substitutes. 209 First,
he could limit development to only one acre and increase the
district's conservation easement to cover the remaining
fourteen acres. 210 Alternatively, he could proceed with the
development as originally proposed but, in addition to the
eleven-acre easement, also agree to pay for improvements to
enhance government-owned wetlands located several miles
away.211 Koontz refused to acquiesce to either alternative and,
after his permit application was denied, sued the district in
state court under a Florida statute allowing the recovery of
damages for a regulatory taking.2 12
After several years of legal wrangling, the trial court
agreed with Koontz. 213 Specifically, the trial court concluded
that the district's demand for off-site mitigation in addition to
the eleven-acre conservation easement failed Nollan/Dolan's
nexus and proportionality requirements. 214 The district
appealed this ruling on two grounds. First, it argued that there
was no exaction, and thus no taking, because Koontz's permit
application had been denied.215 Consequently, without a viable
takings claim, Koontz's suit was improperly brought under the
Florida statute referenced above.216 Second, even assuming a
206. See id. at 2592; see also FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1)(a) (2015) (identifying,
inter alia, preserving public health, preserving property of others, wildlife
conservation, and prohibiting erosion as examples of public interests potentially
at stake).
207. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
208. Id. at 2592-93.
209. Id. at 2593.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2015)).
213. Id.
214. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (St. Johns River Water
Ill), 5 So. 3d 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
215. See id. at 10-I.
216. See id.
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viable takings claim, the district contended that Nollan/Dolan
was inapplicable because the condition at issue involved a
monetary expenditure rather than a physical dedication of
land.2 17
These arguments prevailed before the Florida Supreme
Court, which held that Nollan/Dolan was limited to the
narrow circumstances" in which (1) "the regulatory agency
actually issues the permit sought, thereby rendering the
owner's interest in the real property subject to the dedication
imposed"; and (2) "the condition/exaction sought by the
government involves a dedication of or over the owner's
interest in real property in exchange for permit approval."218
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 219 and ultimately
reversed.220
B. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Alito began
his analysis by clarifying the relationship between Nollan/
Dolan and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 221 As a
general rule, he noted, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
"vindicates the Constitution's enumerated rights by preventing
the government from coercing people into giving them up." 222
The heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan was designed to
address just such an issue because "land-use permit applicants
are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits."223 Justice Alito
elaborated:
By conditioning a building permit on the owner's deeding
over a public right-of-way, for example, the government can
pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up property for
which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just
compensation. So long as the building permit is more
valuable than any just compensation the owner could hope
217. See id. at 12.
218. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla.
2011).
219. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
220. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
221. Id. at 2594-95.
222. Id. at 2594.
223. Id.
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to receive for the right-of-way, the owner is likely to accede
to the government's demand, no matter how unreasonable.
Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation, and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.2 24
In this explanation, one already sees hints of the anti-
evasion characteristics identified earlier in this Article.
Although Justice Alito framed the Nollan/Dolan test (and
along with it, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine) in terms
of coercion, he appeared to use coercion as a sort of shorthand
for something else-namely, governmental efforts to obtain
property interests without having to pay for them. 225 As with
all regulatory takings and unconstitutional conditions
problems, the object of judicial intervention in the Nollan/
Dolan context is to prevent the government from circumventing
constitutional requirements through form-over-substance
behavior. Nollan/Dolan's nexus and proportionality
requirements minimize the likelihood that such evasion will
occur by ensuring that any conditions imposed by the
government are tied to some public interest that the proposed
development is said to endanger. 226 In short, "[u]nder Nollan
and Dolan, the government may choose whether and how a
permit applicant is required to mitigate the impacts of a
proposed development, but it may not leverage its legitimate
interest in mitigation to" undermine the requirement that it
pay just compensation for property it takes.2 27
Having laid that doctrinal foundation, Justice Alito turned
his attention to the specific issues in the case. For starters, he
explained, it mattered little whether the government approved
an application subject to an exaction or denied an application
until the applicant agreed to the exaction. 228 In either
situation, the government effectively demands something from
the applicant in exchange for the permit, and for this reason,
the principles involved are the same regardless of how the
government chooses to package the demand.22 9
224. Id. at 2594-95 (citations omitted).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 2595 ("Insisting that landowners internalize the negative
externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy . . .
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2595-96.
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Again, Justice Alito's discussion reveals the anti-evasion
concerns animating the majority's thinking. A bright-line rule
distinguishing between a conditional approval, on the one
hand, and a denial, on the other, "would enable the government
to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by
phrasing its demands for property as conditions precedent to
permit approval." 230 The vindication of constitutional rights,
the majority suggested, cannot depend on so thin a distinction.
Even so, applying Nollan/Dolan to permit denials poses a
theoretical problem. "Where the permit is denied and the
condition is never imposed," Justice Alito admitted, "nothing
has been taken." 231 How then could the district's refusal to
issue Koontz a permit be viewed as violating the Takings
Clause? Once more invoking the theme of anti-evasion, Justice
Alito answered:
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use
permitting context run afoul of the Taking Clause not
because they take property but because they impermissibly
burden the right not to have property taken without just
compensation. As in other unconstitutional conditions cases
in which someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in
the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a
governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable
injury.232
Thus, in the context of a permit denial, the problem
addressed by Nollan/Dolan is not so much that the
government is taking property without compensation but that
its actions weaken the owner's ability to resist such a taking.
This weakness, in turn, provides the government with
smoother avenues to achieve its goals than the Constitution
permits. 233 The danger, quite simply, is that the government
230. Id. at 2595.
231. Id. at 2597.
232. Id. at 2596.
233. Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (explaining that
regulatory takings doctrine is designed to prevent government from achieving
public purposes "by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change"). In this regard, Nollan/Dolan operates akin to other applications of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Where the government conditions a tax
exemption on a loyalty oath, for example, it is not directly violating free speech
rights because the taxpayer may always refuse to make the oath and forego the
exemption. But the condition, attached to valuable government benefits enjoyed
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will employ conditions-whether attached to a permit approval
or as an alternative to a permit denial-for the purpose of
eluding the restrictions placed upon it by the Takings Clause.
Similar concerns prompted the majority also to reject the
proposed distinction between physical and monetary exactions.
"[I]f we accepted this argument," Justice Alito pointed out, "it
would be very easy for land-use permitting officials to evade
the limitations of Nollan and Dolan."234 This was so because
the effects of an exaction are the same regardless of the form
the exaction takes. Whether the government is demanding a
tangible interest in real property or the payment of money, in
the context of land use approval, the demand is directly linked
to a specific parcel and the owner's rights in it.235
For this reason, exactions of either type run the risk of
transferring the owner's rights to the government. 236 The
"central concern" of Nollan/Dolan is, consequently, triggered
by both scenarios:
The risk that the government may use its substantial power
and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue
governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough
proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the
specific property at issue, thereby diminishing without
justification the value of the property.237
Given that either form of exaction poses this risk, a
decision rule that exempted monetary exactions from the
Nollan/Dolan rule would simply encourage the government to
by those who take the oath, operates as a de facto penalty for taxpayers who insist
upon their First Amendment freedoms. In this way, the condition inhibits
taxpayers from resisting the government's preferred message and undermines the
principles embodied in the Free Speech Clause. See supra notes 111-12 and
accompanying text. It is difficult to see the difference between this First
Amendment scenario and the denial of a development permit to landowners who
refuse to give up their right to be compensated for the taking of their property.
Because landowners who resist will forego a benefit (in the form of the permit)
that those who acquiesce will enjoy, the condition deters their willingness to insist
upon their rights and undermines the principles embodied in the Takings Clause.
234. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599.
235. Id. at 2600.
236. Id.; see also Kent, supra note 28, at 1857 (noting that "[e]xactions of either
stripe are directly tied to the government's authority to regulate land use" and
"what ultimately is at stake, whether the exaction is monetary or physical, is the
owner's ability to move forward with a proposed use of her real property").
237. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
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demand money rather than land so as to escape the heightened
scrutiny that Nollan/Dolan requires.
C. Dissenting Opinion
The foregoing discussion shows the majority's reliance on
anti-evasion concepts. Interestingly, anti-evasion principles
played an important role in Justice Kagan's dissenting opinion
as well.2 38 Indeed, to a significant extent, the dissent and the
majority agreed on the overarching function of the Nollan/
Dolan test. "Nollan and Dolan," Justice Kagan wrote, "prevent
the government from exploiting the landowner's permit
application to evade the constitutional obligation to pay for the
property."239
For this reason, the dissenting justices also agreed that
Nollan/Dolan applies regardless of whether the government
approves a permit subject to an exaction or denies a permit
until the owner acquiesces to the exaction.240 In either
scenario, so long as the government has unequivocally
demanded the exaction, 241 the owner is entitled to challenge
the exaction on the grounds that it fails to meet the nexus and
proportionality standards mandated by those cases.24 2
The dissent, however, parted company with the majority
on the type of demand that qualifies as an exaction for
purposes of applying those standards. Because Nollan/Dolan is
designed to prevent evasion of the just compensation
requirement, Justice Kagan explained, it can only apply to
demands that, "outside the permitting process, would
constitute a taking."243 Otherwise, the demand would not
238. Id. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
239. Id.; see also id. at 2612 (stating that Nollan/Dolan is "designed to curb
governments from using their power over land-use permitting to extract for free
what the Takings Clause would otherwise require them to pay for").
240. Id. at 2603.
241. See id. at 2610 ("Before applying Nollan and Dolan, a court must find that
the permit denial occurred because the government made a demand of the
landowner" and "that demand must be unequivocal.").
242. Id. at 2603. Like the majority, the dissent acknowledged that, in the case
of a permit denial, "nothing has actually been taken." Id. For that reason, Justice
Kagan explained, "[t]he owner is entitled to have the improper condition removed;
and he may be entitled to a monetary remedy created by state law for imposing
such a condition; but he cannot be entitled to constitutional compensation for a
taking of property." Id.
243. Id. at 2605.
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implicate the applicant's constitutional rights, and there would
be no unconstitutional condition for which a remedy would be
necessary.244 The question, then, was whether the demand
made by the water management district-specifically, that
Koontz spend money to repair off-site wetlands-would have
triggered the right to just compensation had it been made
apart from the permitting context. 245
The dissent thought not, relying on Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, where five members of the Court concluded that a
generic demand for the payment of money did not trigger the
Takings Clause. 246 The demand made upon Koontz, Justice
Kagan explained, was no different. It did not burden a
particular piece of real property, nor did it mandate the use of
a specific and identifiable fund.24 7 It simply required Koontz to
perform an act that cost him money and was, in that regard, no
different than any general liability that could be satisfied from
whatever source Koontz chose.24 8 It was, in other words, akin
to a tax.249 Inasmuch as the imposition of a tax ordinarily does
not trigger the Takings Clause, 250 the demand that Koontz
repair the off-site wetlands would not constitute a taking if
made outside the permitting process. 251
That conclusion, in turn, meant that there was no
unconstitutional condition for the Nollan/Dolan test to cure. 252
Put differently, in the dissent's view, the Takings Clause would
not have prevented the government from simply ordering
Koontz to pay for the improvement of public wetlands. 253 And
244. Id.
245. Id. Justice Kagan made it clear that, in her view, no such demand was
ever made of Koontz and, therefore, his claim failed for that reason, as well. See
id. at 2610-11.
246. See 524 U.S. 498, 539-47 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 554-58
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
247. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2606 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
249. Cf. id. at 2607 (suggesting similarities between monetary exactions and
taxes).
250. See id. at 2600 (majority opinion) ("It is beyond dispute that '[tiaxes and
user fees ... are not 'takings."') (quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538
U.S. 216, 243 n.2 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)).
251. Id. at 2606 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 2605-06.
253. See id. at 2606 ("[Tihe order to repair wetlands, viewed independent of the
permitting process, does not constitute a taking."). The dissent held open the
possibility, however, that such an order might violate notions of due process. See
id. at 2609 ("[A] court can use ... the Due Process Clause ... to protect against
monetary demands . . . .").
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what would not have been a taking if pursued directly is not
transformed into a taking merely because it is pursued
indirectly through a permit condition. 254 In the dissent's view,
the AED created in Nollan/Dolan did not need to be utilized
because the government was not attempting to evade any
restriction imposed by the Takings Clause.
D. The Implicit Debate Over Political Safeguards
One of the striking features of Koontz is that all nine
justices so fundamentally agreed on the function of the Nollan/
Dolan test while simultaneously disagreeing about how that
test should be applied. As demonstrated, both the majority and
the dissent described Nollan/Dolan as an AED that serves to
prevent evasion of the constitutional just compensation
requirement through use of the government's permitting
authority.2 55 But the majority and the dissent could not agree
on how far to take the anti-evasion notions at the heart of the
Nollan/Dolan framework. A close reading of the opinions
suggests that this disagreement can be explained by the
political safeguards theory outlined above. Put succinctly, the
opinions reveal an implicit debate over the adequacy of the
political process to shelter landowners such as Koontz from
overreaching demands that they pay money in exchange for
development approval.
Consider again Justice Kagan's suggestion that the
monetary payment demanded of Koontz was analogous to a
tax.256 Although she accused the majority of unnecessarily
conjoining taxes and takings, Justice Kagan left no doubt that
she thought something bigger than mere doctrinal confusion
was at stake. Her points concerning taxation occurred in the
midst of a larger discussion about the ramifications of the
majority's holding more generally. 257 By extending Nollan/
Dolan to monetary exactions, she insisted, the majority had
interjected heightened scrutiny "into the very heart of local
254. Id. at 2606 (stating that connection to permitting process alone "is
insufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny"); cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. &
Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58-59 (2006) (holding that "a funding condition
cannot be unconstitutional if it could be constitutionally imposed directly").
255. See supra notes 221-27, 238-39 and accompanying text.
256. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
257. Id.
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land-use regulation and service delivery." 258 And the
consequences of this interjection were severe: "The Federal
Constitution thus will decide whether one town is overcharging
for sewage, or another is setting the price to sell liquor too
high. And the flexibility of state and local governments to take
the most routine actions to enhance their communities will
diminish accordingly." 259
This concern over judicial intrusion into local affairs
carries with it the message that the types of issues raised by
Justice Kagan-the provision of public utility services, the cost
of business and alcohol permits, decisions about community
identity, etc.260 -are better addressed in the legislative than
judicial arena. But inherent in that message is the further
notion that the legislative process can adequately protect
whatever constitutional concerns might be raised by these local
issues. Although her dissent did not say so explicitly, Justice
Kagan intimated that political recourse typically will be
available to curb governmental overreaching:
At bottom, the majority's analysis seems to grow out of a
yen for a prophylactic rule: Unless Nollan and Dolan apply
to monetary demands, the majority worries, "land-use
permitting officials" could easily "evade the limitations" on
exactions of real property interests that those decisions
impose. But that is a prophylaxis in search of a problem. No
one has presented evidence that in the many States
declining to apply heightened scrutiny to permitting fees,
local officials routinely short-circuit Nollan and Dolan to
extort the surrender of real property interests having no
relation to a development's costs. 261
Unspoken, yet suggested, in this passage is that the evidence
almost certainly leads to a contrary result. One hears in Justice
Kagan's dissent echoes of the explanation that state courts
have offered for declining to extend Nollan/Dolan: "A city
council that charged extortionate fees for all property
development, unjustifiable by mitigation needs, would likely
face widespread and well-financed opposition at the next
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2608 (citations omitted).
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election."262 In this view, the democratic political processes can
handle these cases better than judicial intervention, which
promises "to wreck land-use permitting throughout the
country-to the detriment of both communities and property
owners."263
By contrast, Justice Alito's opinion hints that the majority
of the justices thought the political process insufficient to
protect the constitutional norms at stake. When explaining the
rationale underlying the Nollan/Dolan standards, Justice Alito
noted that land use applicants remain "especially vulnerable"
to "[e]xtortionate demands" from government officials. 2 64 This
is true because the government wields "substantial power and
discretion" in the land use process,265 which sometimes crosses
the constitutional line-even in the service of some public good
or purpose-by forcing a subset of the population to carry
burdens that should be borne by the public as a whole. 26 6 As
with regulatory takings more generally, there is a considerable
danger that the taxpaying public will not only tolerate such
redistribution of public burdens but will desire and celebrate
it.267 If a substantial portion of the public is happy to shift the
costs of public projects to others, and if land use applicants can
effectively be pressured into paying those costs, then one would
expect the political process to favor candidates and policies
accomplishing those results.
This view was reinforced by the majority's discussion of
taxation. Answering the dissent's argument that the majority
had confused the power to tax and the power to take, Justice
Alito indicated that any confusion was already inherent in the
powers themselves. Although it was "beyond dispute" that
taxes are not takings, 268 he explained, "we have repeatedly
found takings where the government, by confiscating financial
obligations, achieved a result that could have been obtained by
imposing a tax."269 The Court's prior precedent, and not its
262. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002).
263. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2594-95 (majority opinion).
265. Id. at 2600.
266. Cf. id. ("Whatever the wisdom of [making a landowner improve nearby
public lands], it would transfer an interest in property from the landowner to the
government.").
267. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
268. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
269. Id. at 2601.
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extension of Nollan/Dolan to monetary exactions, produced
whatever confusion existed.270
At the same time, Justice Alito explained that the
confusion was more theoretical than practical.271 In most cases
where the confiscation of money was held to be a taking, the
government actually could not have achieved its result through
taxation because of various state laws restricting the power to
tax.272 Implicit in this statement is the view that the taxing
power is monitored and controlled by the political process in
ways that other governmental powers are not. Indeed, evading
the restraints on the government's ability to impose taxes
seems to be the very catalyst for attempting to exact money by
other means.273 Thus, in the majority's view, minimal judicial
intervention is necessary to monitor the exercise of the taxing
power because process protections generally exist to curb
abuses of that power. Because similar process protections do
not exist in the land use permitting context, the majority
seemed to say, judicial involvement must be more vigorous.
E. Summary
Viewing Koontz through the prism of the anti-evasion and
political safeguards theories helps to explain the majority's
decision in that case, as well as to bring the differences
between the majority and dissent into clearer focus. But it also
suggests some guidelines for determining issues inherently
raised, but not resolved, by Koontz's extension of the Nollan/
Dolan framework. It is to those issues that the next Part turns.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE LITIGATION
Koontz's extension of the Nollan/Dolan framework has
several implications for future litigation in the exactions arena.
To begin with, additional decision rules will need to be
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2601-02.
272. Id.; cf. Kent, supra note 28, at 1868-75 (outlining legal differences
between taxes and regulatory fees and discussing difficulty of labeling
development impact fees as either device).
273. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2602 ('[B]ecause Florida law greatly
circumscribes respondent's power to tax ... [i]f respondent had argued that its
demand for money was a tax, it would have effectively conceded that its denial of
petitioner's permit was improper under Florida law.").
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developed so that claims brought under Koontz can properly be
evaluated. In particular, courts will need to determine exactly
when a permit denial triggers Nollan/Dolan, as well as the
proper remedies to apply to a permit denial that violates
Nollan/Dolan's nexus and proportionality standards.
Additionally, quite aside from these micro-level questions is the
larger issue of Koontz's effect on macro-level doctrinal
development: What does Koontz suggest more generally about
the protection of constitutional property rights and the
relationship-so important to Lingle-between the Takings
and Due Process Clauses?
A. Micro-Level Questions
1. When Does a Permit Denial Trigger Nollan/
Dolan?
Justice Alito's majority opinion left open two significant
questions concerning how a Nollan/Dolan violation will work
in the context of a permit denial. First, there is the issue of how
to distinguish cases where the denial results from the
applicant's refusal to accede to an improper exaction and those
where the permit is denied for other, valid regulatory purposes.
How to tell the difference between the two situations-and
into which category the denial of Koontz's permit fell-was yet
another sticking point for Justice Kagan and her colleagues in
dissent.274 In their view, the government had not actually
demanded anything of Koontz at all. Rather, when faced with
an application that did not meet the legal requirements for
obtaining a permit, the reviewing agency simply suggested
ways that Koontz might modify his application to meet those
requirements. 275 When Koontz refused to continue negotiating,
the agency denied the permit application "consistent with its
original view that [the application] failed to satisfy Florida
law."27 6 Thus, in Justice Kagan's telling, the denial was not
based on Koontz's resistance to a demanded exaction because
no such demand was ever made. 277 Instead, the government
denied his permit application on the basis that granting the
274. See id. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
275. See id.
276. Id. at 2611.
277. Id.
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permit would injure wildlife associated with his wetlands in
violation of Florida law.2 78 This type of denial, Justice Kagan
suggested, should be reviewed under the Penn Central test
rather than the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan.279
Although I am not convinced by Justice Kagan's analysis of
Koontz itself,280 her larger point is well taken. How specific
must a demand be before it can legitimately form the basis for
a permit denial and, thus, trigger Nollan/Dolan? As explained
above, those cases are designed to prevent the government
from evading the constitutional requirement to compensate for
property it takes.2 8 1 Their function is not to prohibit regulation
or thwart the negotiations that inevitably take place between
local governments and applicants in the land use process.
Unless the nexus and proportionality standards are to apply to
every case in which an exaction might have been raised in any
manner and at any point during the application review process,
it will be necessary to distinguish permit denials governed by
Nollan/Dolan from those that are not.
In this regard, Justice Kagan suggested that, to trigger
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2610.
280. Specifically, I do not believe the facts of the case were as unambiguous as
Justice Kagan understood them to be. As the majority pointed out, the state
courts clearly characterized the government's conduct as a demand, and the
accuracy of that characterization was not within the scope of the Court's review.
See id. at 2598 (majority opinion). Moreover, the decisions of the Florida Fifth
District Court of Appeal, which had reviewed the case four times before it went to
the United States Supreme Court, plainly indicate that the government did more
than merely make suggestions to Koontz. Rather, in the words of that court, the
government told Koontz "that it would approve the permits only if [he] agreed to
satisfy certain conditions, one of which was the performance of 'off-site' mitigation
involving property a considerable distance from [his] property." St. Johns River
Water III, 5 So. 3d 8, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). Finally,
contrary to Justice Kagan's suggestion, Koontz's application did not on its face fail
to satisfy Florida's legal requirements. Although the water management district
determined that Koontz's development proposal would adversely affect fish and
wildlife, St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (St. John's River Water 1),
861 So. 2d 1267, 1269-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring), the
support for this conclusion was, at best, mixed. Three experts testified that
additional mitigation was unnecessary, and the agency's own scientist admitted
that there were no fish on Koontz's property and that she had not performed a
wildlife survey. See id. at 1269-70. These facts strongly suggest that the denial of
the permit was grounded in Koontz's refusal to perform the specific off-site
mitigation requested by the agency, and not for any larger purpose relating to
wildlife protection. At the very least, they create a sufficient question to defer, as
the majority correctly did, to the state courts that had repeatedly evaluated the
case over a series of several years.
281. See supra text accompanying note 255.
874 [Vol. 87
2016] EXACTIONS THROUGH ANTI-EVASION PRISM
Nollan/Dolan, an applicant must demonstrate that it rejected
an unequivocal demand from the government. 282 Only upon
such a showing, she insisted, could a permit denial properly be
subjected to the nexus and proportionality requirements. 283
Otherwise, government agencies would run the risk of
litigation under Nollan/Dolan anytime they attempted to
communicate their concerns about a land use project and offer
ways in which those concerns might be assuaged. 284 That risk,
in turn, ultimately would make it safer for the government to
deny a troubling application than to negotiate mitigation
measures.285
I have doubts that a more fluid standard will necessarily
produce these results. First, as the majority pointed out,
several state courts had already applied Nollan/Dolan to
monetary exactions without the dire consequences predicted by
the dissent.286 Second, similar arguments were made about the
potential impact of Nollan and Dolan themselves, 287 but the
empirical evidence suggests that these dangers have not
materialized. 288 Indeed, one study found that the decisions
"tend to favor a comprehensive, long-range approach to
planning that avoids ad hoc decision-making," and that they
sometimes justify the imposition of more intense exactions
than the government actually imposed. 289 Third, in an era of
shrinking revenues and tax revolts, it is difficult to believe that
local governments will completely abandon their efforts to
negotiate for exactions and thereby shift to land developers
some of the costs for public projects. 290
282. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 2602 (majority opinion).
287. See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollack, Takings on the Ground: How the
Supreme Court's Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 103, 105 (2001) (noting that Nollan and Dolan "initially engendered
fears about their potentially chilling effects on land use practices").
288. See id. at 142-43 (finding that large majority of California planners view
Nollan/Dolan favorably and consider them to embody "good land use planning
practice").
289. Id. at 143.
290. Cf. Been, supra note 15, at 482 (characterizing cost shifting as "main
reason" that local governments impose exactions); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The
Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with
Impact Fees, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 177, 191 (2006) (describing "unmistakable
trend ... towards a system of local government 'non-financing' through increased
875
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
Ultimately, however, I disagree with Justice Kagan's call
for an "unequivocal demand" test291 primarily on doctrinal
grounds. The test is too reminiscent of an ex ante rule to serve
its anti-evasion function adequately. Although there may be
some room at the margins to debate what constitutes a
"demand" and what qualifies as "unequivocal," the test raises
the specter of bright-line categorization that encourages
evasive conduct. 292 Enforcing Nollan/Dolan, itself an anti-
evasion doctrine, with a test that promotes further evasion
would be ironic at best and self-defeating at worst. For this
reason, a standard-with its attendant unpredictability-
seems preferable to a rule.
In place of the dissent's "unequivocal demand" test,
therefore, I propose a modified version of the "substantial or
motivating factor" test utilized in some unconstitutional
conditions cases under the First Amendment. Established in
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,
the test typically applies when a public employee or contractor
claims to have suffered some adverse employment action in
retaliation for exercising his free speech rights.293 Because
employment decisions often result from multiple
considerations, the Court "found it necessary to formulate a
test of causation which distinguishes between a result caused
by a constitutional violation and one not so caused." 294
Thus, the Mt. Healthy test requires the plaintiff to show,
first, that his conduct was in fact protected by the Constitution
and, second, that his conduct was a substantial or motivating
factor in the government's decision concerning his
employment.295 If these two showings are made, the burden
reliance on cost-shifting to the developer").
291. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
292. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 995
(1995) ("Because rules have clear edges, they allow people to 'evade' them by
engaging in conduct that is technically exempted but that creates the same or
analogous harms.").
293. 429 U.S. 274, 276, 285 (1977); see also Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr,
518 U.S. 668 (1996) (applying test to government contractors). The test has its
origins in criminal law issues relating to tainted evidence and has been
incorporated into a number of federal employment statutes, either by judicial
decision rule or statutory codification. See generally Bryan S. Clarke, A Better
Route Through the Swamp: Causal Coherence in Disparate Treatment Doctrine, 65
RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 738-44 (2013) (discussing origins and subsequent history of
Mt. Healthy test).
294. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286.
295. Id. at 287. The Court seems to use the terms "substantial" and
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then shifts to the government to demonstrate that it would
have rendered the same decision even absent the protected
conduct.296
A similar test seems appropriate to distinguish between
land use denials resulting from a Nollan/Dolan violation and
those resulting from some other cause. As with the employment
cases in which the Mt. Healthy test is most routinely applied, a
land use decision will often be the result of multiple
considerations and, therefore, a test that accounts for the
government's various motives seems particularly helpful.
Moreover, inasmuch as the decision to grant or deny a given
land use application typically remains within the government's
discretion, there should be sufficient room for the government
to demonstrate that it would have exercised its discretion just
as it did even if the exaction had never been raised.
Nonetheless, to adapt the Mt. Healthy test to this context
requires some slight modification. Because the Nollan/Dolan
framework places the burden on the government to
demonstrate that its conduct was constitutional, 297 the plaintiff
need only show that its refusal to acquiesce to a particular
exaction was a motivating factor in the government's decision
to deny approval for the land use project. While I do not believe
that an "unequivocal demand" is required, the plaintiff must
show more than a general suggestion by the government that
measures to mitigate the impact of the project might be
necessary. Instead, the plaintiff needs to point to some specific
condition proposed by the government-like the off-site
improvements in Koontz-the rejection of which, based on all
the facts and circumstances, seemingly played a substantial
role in the decision to deny the plaintiffs application.
Once the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden then
shifts to the government to demonstrate, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that it would have reached the same decision
(denial of the project) regardless of the plaintiffs rejection of
the exaction at issue. If the government can meet this burden,
then Nollan/Dolan does not apply and, as Justice Kagan
suggested, any takings claim arising from the denial of the
'motivating" interchangeably. See id.; accord Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 675.
296. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
297. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (placing burden on
city to "make some sort of individualized determination that the [exaction] is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development").
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application is evaluated under another test (Lucas or Penn
Central, for example). 29 8 But if the government cannot satisfy
its burden, then the denial of the application is presumptively
based on the plaintiffs failure to accede to the exaction, and
the government must prove that the exaction would have
complied with Nollan/Dolan's nexus and proportionality
requirements.
2. How to Remedy a Permit Denial that Violates
Nollan/Dolan?
A proposed exaction that lacks the requisite nexus and
proportionality would raise the second question left open by
Koontz: What is the appropriate remedy for a violation of
Nollan/Dolan in the context of a permit denial? As explained
above, the majority conceded that, in this context, "nothing has
been taken," and therefore the constitutional remedy of just
compensation does not apply.29 9 The dissent concurred
completely with this proposition,3 0 0 meaning that the entire
Court agreed that just compensation is not the remedy for an
unconstitutional condition of this type. Moreover, the justices
seemed to agree that money damages might or might not be
available, depending on the particular state or federal cause of
action the plaintiff utilized to advance the claim. 30 1
The dissent suggested, however, that the most appropriate
remedy would be the invalidation of the offending condition. 302
Presumably, this remedy envisions a judicial order prohibiting
the government not only from imposing the condition, but also
from using the plaintiffs refusal of the condition as a basis for
denying the application. This remedy comports with the result
in most other unconstitutional conditions cases, 303 and I agree
that it is a particularly suitable remedy for this type of case as
well. Because at this stage of the analysis, however, the
298. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2610-I1
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 2597 (majority opinion).
300. Id. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 2597 (majority opinion); id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("The owner is entitled to have the
improper condition removed. . . ."); id. at 2611 (suggesting that plaintiff could sue
"to invalidate the purported demand as an unconstitutional condition").
303. See, e.g., Agency for Int'l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. 133 S. Ct.
2321 (2013); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958).
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burden-shifting framework outlined above presumes that the
plaintiffs refusal to accede to the exaction was the reason her
application was denied, an order invalidating the condition
would necessarily remove the only basis for the denial. As a
result, such an order would also require that the plaintiffs
application be granted.
Once this occurs, however, the plaintiff possibly could be
entitled to just compensation upon proving that the initial
denial of the permit worked a "temporary taking." Now that
the permit must be granted because of the government's failure
to adhere to Nollan/Dolan, the question becomes whether the
government's refusal to grant it earlier took the plaintiffs
property during the period in which the Nollan/Dolan claim
was being litigated. That question must necessarily be
evaluated according to the other takings tests-i.e., whether
the improper denial of the permit deprived the owner of all
economically beneficial use or otherwise failed the balancing
test established by Penn Central304 prior to the court order
requiring the permit to be granted. If so, then a taking occurred
despite the fact that the permit is belatedly issued, and the
plaintiff would be owed compensation for the period of time in
which the taking existed.305
B. Macro-Level Questions
In addition to the foregoing micro-level questions, Koontz
raises significant macro-level questions concerning the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence and the proper place of the
exactions cases within the larger constitutional protections for
property rights. At the heart of these questions is Koontz's
compatibility with Lingle and that decision's distinction
between takings and due process challenges to land use
regulations.
As an initial matter, the majority's concession that no
taking occurs if the permit is denied 306 and its application of
the Nollan/Dolan standards to monetary exactionS 307 raise
304. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
305. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S.
304, 318-22 (1987) (concluding that government must compensate for "temporary
takings").
306. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
307. Id. at 2598-99.
879
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
concerns about how closely Koontz fits with the "functional
equivalence" touchstone established in Lingle.308 Additionally,
as indicated by my proposed "substantial or motivating factor"
test, an evaluation of the government's motives in denying the
permit lies at the heart of the constitutional inquiry in this
context, suggesting the inquiry is closer to a due process
analysis than a takings analysis. In light of these issues, it is
appropriate to wonder whether Koontz (and perhaps Nollan
and Dolan, as well) properly lie within the "takings realm" at
all. 309
At least one scholar has answered that question in the
negative. Mark Fenster has opined that, after Koontz, the
Court's exactions decisions should be viewed as sounding not
under the Takings Clause but, rather, as a species of
substantive due process. 310 Although I agree with Professor
Fenster's ultimate conclusion, I am not persuaded that the
Court's exactions jurisprudence necessarily lies outside the
ambit of the Takings Clause. After all, in both Nollan and
Dolan, the permit condition imposed by the government clearly
burdened the owner's property rights by demanding a physical
interest in the parcels.311 And in Koontz itself, even though the
permit was denied, that denial resulted from the landowner's
refusal to accede to a governmental demand that was directly
linked to the owner's rights in his parcel. 312
As I have explained elsewhere, in every exaction case,
"what ultimately is at stake ... is the owner's ability to move
forward with a proposed use of her real property." 313
Irrespective of whether the exaction at issue is physical or
monetary, and regardless of whether the permit is
conditionally granted or denied because the applicant refuses
the condition, the applicant's right to use its land depends on
its willingness to give something to the government. Thus,
exactions inherently involve burdens on property, and for this
308. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
309. See Fenster, supra note 36, at 404 (arguing that Koontz demonstrates that
the Court's exactions cases are "conceptually and practically outside of the federal
constitutional takings realm entirely").
310. Id. at 414-17.
311. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
312. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 ("The fulcrum this case turns on is the
direct link between the government's demand and a specific parcel of real
property.").
313. Kent, supra note 28, at 1857.
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reason, the Court's exactions cases (including Koontz) are not
so fundamentally unrelated to Lingle's understanding of the
takings inquiry that they must be viewed as wholly
independent of it.
Even so, fitting the exactions cases neatly into the Lingle
framework has always proved a bit challenging, as Lingle itself
acknowledged. 314 To say that land use exactions necessarily
burden property is not to say that they are always
unconstitutionally burdensome. Once a case moves beyond the
specific fact set at issue in Nollan and Dolan, analytical
problems undeniably arise. Unlike the easements requested in
those two cases, monetary exactions do not clearly qualify as
the functional equivalent of a direct appropriation. 315 And
conceptualizing an exactions case as functionally equivalent to
a direct appropriation becomes even more difficult where the
government never actually imposes the condition and the
landowner never hands anything over. Although land use
exactions present dangers similar to those covered by the
Takings Clause, cases like Koontz demonstrate that they also
can introduce issues for which the takings paradigm offers no
easy resolution.
The precise source of authority for the Court's exactions
jurisprudence, at least as extended by Koontz, thus presents
something of a conundrum. In a recent paper dealing with anti-
evasion under the Confrontation Clause, however, David Noll
has suggested a helpful framework for answering this type of
question. 316 When implementing devices to curb evasive
activity, Professor Noll acknowledges, courts must decide
whether that implementation will occur "under the specific
provision being evaded or a broader source of authority, such as
the Due Process Clause." 317 The answer to this question, Noll
posits, typically turns on two subordinate factors: "[t]he
obviousness of the evasion, and the means-end fit between the
primary constitutional provision and the regulatory response
the court believes appropriate."318
In a case like Koontz, both factors weigh heavily in favor of
314. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005).
315. See Kent, supra note 28, at 1857.
316. David L. Noll, Constitutional Evasion and the Confrontation Puzzle, 56
B.C. L. REV. 1899, 1968 (2015).
317. Id.
318. Id.
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a due process remedy. To begin with, not all land use exactions
are clearly designed to evade the Takings Clause. Although
they undeniably create evasive opportunities, avoiding
constitutional strictures is not the only reason for a
government to utilize exactions in the land use context.
Moreover, a straightforward application of the remedial
scheme envisioned by the Takings Clause-requiring the
government to provide compensation for property it takes-will
not adequately curb evasion in every situation, as the facts of
Koontz plainly show. 319 As discussed above, in some cases, a
more appropriate remedy might be to proscribe the imposition
of the exaction altogether or otherwise to limit the
government's regulatory power. 320 Remedies of this nature
seem more naturally suited to the Due Process Clause than the
Takings Clause, even though the latter provides the
foundational principles that such remedies seek to protect.
At this point, then, I agree with Professor Fenster that the
Koontz majority's invocation of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is telling.321 That doctrine, at least in its development,
traditionally has been associated with substantive due
process. 322 Moreover, since its inception, the doctrine has been
at least partially concerned with the purposes that lay behind
government-imposed conditions, 323 an inquiry that Lingle
unmistakably places within the primary jurisdiction of the Due
Process Clause. 324 The majority's appeal to the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is a tacit admission that these
concerns are at work in the Court's exactions jurisprudence.
Indeed, similar concerns have animated the Court since its
first foray into the exactions debate. In Nollan, the Court
grounded its scrutiny of land use exactions in the need to
forestall improper leveraging-that is, the government
exercising its monopoly power over land use regulation to
demand concessions from property owners it would not
319. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591-94
(2013).
320. See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
321. Fenster, supra note 36, at 415-17.
322. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence:
The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-
Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 91-92 (2006) (linking
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to Lochner-era development of economic
substantive due process); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1416 (same).
323. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
324. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-43 (2005).
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otherwise be able to obtain.325 As the Nollan majority
explained:
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of
leveraging of the police power is allowed would produce
stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives
to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of
the land-use goals purportedly sought to be served than
would result from more lenient (but nontradeable)
development restrictions. 326
As this language makes clear, the purpose for which the
condition was imposed formed a primary component of the
Court's theoretical basis for Nollan's "essential nexus"
requirement. Commentators have explained the Nollan/Dolan
test in comparable terms, frequently focusing on the rationality
and legitimacy of the government's demand rather than the
precise burden that it imposes on the applicant's property. 327
Finally, Koontz itself echoes these means-ends
characterizations, stating that the government "may not
leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue
governmental ends" that violate the nexus and proportionality
standards. 328  As Professor Fenster argues, 329  these
explanations sound very similar to the sort of due process
notions that Lingle said "ha[ve] no proper place in our takings
jurisprudence."330
325. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
326. Id. at 837 n.5.
327. See, e.g., Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal Bridging the
Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 491 (2006) ('[Tihe state can
use its monopoly power over land use decision making to exact objectively
unreasonable property demands . . . ."); Alan Romero, Two Constitutional Theories
for Invalidating Extortionate Exactions, 78 NEB. L. REV. 348, 350 (1999) ("An
unrelated or disproportionate exaction reveals that the government's only purpose
for applying a particular land-use restriction to a particular property is to obtain
some property interest from the owner, rather than to harmonize public and
private interests by mitigating the negative effects of the requested land use.
Such a purpose is illegitimate.").
328. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 2597-98 (noting that Koontz's claim was brought
under Florida statute providing cause of action for "an unreasonable exercise of
the state's police power constituting a taking without just compensation")
(emphasis added).
329. Fenster, supra note 36, at 416.
330. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
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Accordingly, the most accurate understanding of the
Court's post-Koontz exactions jurisprudence is to view it as a
due process-based remedy designed to restrain Takings Clause
evasion. To some extent, this blending of substantive due
process with the takings protections seems inevitable, Lingle's
attempts at wholesale segregation notwithstanding. 331 As
government actors continue to develop additional ways to
circumvent the Takings Clause, the Court will presumably
continue (as it did in Koontz) to create additional decision rules
aimed at curbing that evasion. As these additional AEDs are
layered on top of the prior body of doctrine, there is a tendency
for them to move further and further from the Takings Clause's
core proposition. At some point, to achieve optimal enforcement
of that proposition, the rules will begin to police unenumerated
limits beyond which the government simply is forbidden to
cross. Insofar as that policing function is what is meant by
"substantive due process," if the Court is serious about
regulating evasive conduct, due process elements will
unavoidably creep into the decision rules.
The Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to admit
this type of doctrinal commingling, at least in the context of
constitutional property protections. This reluctance is most
likely born from a fear that admitting such commingling would
signal a return to the sort of economic due process the Court
long ago rejected.332 In fact, in a recent takings case, a plurality
of the Court reiterated that "the 'liberties' protected by
Substantive Due Process do not include economic liberties."333
This statement came in response to an argument by Justice
Kennedy (joined by Justice Sotomayor) that so-called "judicial
takings" are best understood not as uncompensated takings
331. Special thanks to Brannon Denning for the following insights.
332. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) ("Liberty
implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.") (quoting
Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 565 (1911)); Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 532 (1934) ("The due process clause makes no mention
of sales or of prices any more than it speaks of business or contracts or buildings
or other incidents of property."); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought.").
333. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 721 (2010) (plurality).
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but, rather, as deprivations of property without due process. 334
Justice Scalia and three other justices rejected this argument
as "propel[ling] us back to what is referred to (usually
deprecatingly) as 'the Lochner era.' 335 In view of these
statements, an explicit judicial admission that the exactions
cases incorporate due process components seems unlikely. The
tacit admission of Koontz, through its invocation of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, may be the best for which
one can hope.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory takings and the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, although often puzzling in both their theoretical
bases and their various applications, can be understood as anti-
evasion doctrines. At bottom, they operate to fill enforcement
gaps left open by other constitutional decision rules. They
perform this function by preventing government actors from
elevating form over substance or accomplishing indirectly that
which cannot be done directly. It should come as no surprise,
then, that anti-evasion plays a significant role in the
constitutional treatment of land use exactions, as both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Koontz demonstrate.
Viewing the exactions rules of Nollan and Dolan through
the prism of anti-evasion is useful on a number of fronts. First,
it helps make sense of the Court's extension of those rules in
Koontz, as well as to focus the debate between the majority and
the dissenting justices regarding the propriety of that
extension. Second, it assists in answering the micro-level
questions left open by Koontz-specifically, how to prove and
remedy a violation when the exacted condition is not actually
imposed but nonetheless features prominently in the
government's decision to deny the proposed land use. Finally,
regarding the exactions rules as a form of anti-evasion doctrine
contributes to a better understanding of their place in the
larger constitutional landscape. Despite the Court's
delineations between takings and substantive due process-
334. See id. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If a judicial decision, as opposed
to an act of the executive or the legislature, eliminates an established property
right, the judgment could be set aside as a deprivation of property without due
process of law.").
335. Id. at 721 (plurality opinion).
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delineations that are helpful, in the main-there remains a
perhaps inevitable element of the latter in the Court's
exactions jurisprudence.
